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INTRODUCTION: ARE LA WYERS A PRINCIPLED "ARISTOCRACY" OR 
"BLOOD-SUCKING LEECHES"? 
We lawyers like to think of ourselves as principled people defending 
the spirit and institutions of the Rule of Law. De Tocqueville, in his classic 
Democracy in America, described lawyers as the American aristocracy. 1 
Unfortunately, to the extent it exists, that aristocracy has become much like 
the corrupt and abusive French version of the species, one that led to the 
French Revolution and the overthrow of the Ancien Regime.2 
I. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 
1945) ("In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the 
wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and the most cultivated por-
tion of society .... If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply 
without hesitation that it is not among the rich, who are united by no common tie, but that it 
occupies the judicial bench and the bar."). 
2. The most prestigious lawyers in the largest and most elite law firms arguably fit 
into the category that French philosopher Jacques Ellul described as the "servants of tech-
nique" with the firms and their extremely powerful clients being the institutions through 
which Ellul's "technological society" operates. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOCIETY 349 (1964). In such a system we see the institution in control of the individual ra-
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At this point in American history, lawyers seem to be the only ones 
who think well of their profession. At least in terms of the public's percep-
tion, lawyers are greedy, "asset sucking" parasites feeding off clients rather 
than serving them with diligence and faithfulness. In one cartoon, for exam-
ple, a patient is sitting on the edge of a doctor's examining table with the 
physician standing thoughtfully behind him. On the patient's back is an ugly 
gnome-like creature--complete with miniature suit and briefcase. Its teeth 
and claws are dug into the patient's back. The doctor offers the following 
diagnosis: "I can see what's causing the problem-you've got a lawyer on 
your back. "3 In another cartoon two women are sharing coffee, and one re-
marks: "It's finally over-Frank's lawyer got the apartment, and my lawyer 
got our two cars and the beach house."4 
Although I am arguing that the situation involving poor and unethical 
professional service is becoming worse due to economic pressures and an 
oversupply of lawyers relative to paying clients, it would be naive to sug-
gest there ever was a golden age in which the bar was uniformly comprised 
of highly principled lawyers.5 We need only think back to Dickens' Bleak 
House with its dismaying ending after years of hearings and litigation in the 
Court of Chancery over a rich potential inheritance.6 The case of Jarndyce 
and Jarndyce came to its final anticlimactic end with the "good news/bad 
news" ruling by the court proclaiming that a long time claimant had in fact 
won. Unfortunately this was followed by the pronouncement that there was 
no corpus left in the estate because it had been eaten up by costs and legal 
fees. The court had received its portion of the fees over years of protracted 
litigation. Hordes of lawyers had sustained their law practices on the aspira-
tions of potential heirs encouraged to overestimate the likelihood of their 
ther than an existentialist triumph of the principled person. Ellul observes that in a society 
dominated by large institutions: "The intelligentsia will no longer be a model, a conscience, 
or an animating intellectual spirit .... They will be the servants, the most conformist imagi-
nable, of the instruments of technique." !d. 
3. LAWYERS! LAWYERS! LAWYERS!: A CARTOON COLLECTION l (Samuel Grossed., 
1994). 
4. /d. at ll. We rationalize and deny the amoral nature of our behavior. ABRAHAM 
MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 66 (2d ed. 1968). Maslow describes human self-
deception as being a flight from knowledge that would otherwise cause us to face ourselves 
honestly. /d. He explains: "We tend to be afraid of any knowledge that could cause us to 
despise ourselves or to make us feel inferior, weak, worthless, evil, shameful." /d. 
5. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 
l 00 DICK. L. REv. 549 (1996), for the idea that we tend to overstate the historical virtues of 
lawyers. A leading American scholar on legal ethics and professionalism, Thomas Morgan, 
has described the trends and conditions affecting the U.S. legal profession and challenged its 
right to continue any claim to that privileged status. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE 
VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 19-70 (20 I 0). 
6. David Perdue, David Perdue's Charles Dickens Page-Bleak House, 
http:/ /charlesdickenspage.comlbleakhouse.html (last visited Oct. 21, 20 12) (citing CHARLES 
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1852-1853)). 
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chances. Those hopeful heirs had been in many instances rendered bankrupt 
as they exhausted their resources and borrowed money to finance the fees, 
and once the carcass had been stripped of all sustenance, the judge was 
somehow able to reach a decision after years of dithering and delay. 
Private law practice has always been a business, but the rules of ethics 
and lawyers' espoused principles sought to add a special element that made 
what lawyers do something more than a business-something that Judge 
William Hoevelar described as a "sacred trust."7 The undeniable fact is that 
regardless of elevated rhetoric the private practice of law is a business and, 
for too many lawyers, nothing but a business. 8 There has been an almost 
complete commercialization of the private sector of the legal profession.9 
The primary aim of the private law business is to extract the maximum eco-
nomic benefit from the available assets (clients) with the greatest efficiency 
and at the least cost to the business in terms of financial expenditure by the 
lawyer and efficient use of time to maximize earnings. 10 The problem with 
the reality of law practice is that it arrogates to itself the terms of ethical 
regulation and has erected barriers to civil liability that make it extremely 
difficult for wronged clients to identify their lawyers' deficiencies and re-
cover compensation for unprofessional and incompetent representation. 
At this point we need to abandon rhetoric about what we wish the le-
gal profession to be and become realistic about what it actually is, who we 
are, and how we behave. The "bottom line" should be one understood and 
accepted by lawyers who run their law practices as a business. This means 
that lawyers are engaged in a business for profit and need to be regulated 
and treated as such. Yet many lawyers are caught in the confusion between 
idealized professionalism and the rigors of business. One consequence is 
that lawyers operate under assumptions that on the one hand allow them to 
disassociate the price of their services from the quality and degree of sue-
7. "Men and women entering the practice of law undertake an important trust, a 
trust that involves the care of other people's lives, their money, their fortunes and their fu-
tures. That's why we are required to take an oath, because we are undertaking this sacred 
trust." Professionalism in Practice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 48, 50 (quoting Judge William 
M. Hoevelar). 
8. See, e.g., Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business Methods to 
the Practice of Law, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 17-18 (1998). 
9. See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to 
Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
203 (2004). For some thoughts on the direct impact of economic trends on law practice see 
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between 
Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991); Vincent R. Johnson & Vir-
ginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Law-
yering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 359 (1990); F. Bentley Mooney, Jr., How to Triple Your 
Effective Hourly Billing Rates, 15 A.B.A J. LEGAL ECON., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32; Marc Ga-
lanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REv. 905 (1994). 
I 0. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
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cess and on the other fail to comprehend important trends and technological 
changes that are altering dramatically the conditions of competition and the 
ways in which successful "law businesses" must work. 11 There is a need to 
create a comprehensive system of regulation through civil law rather than 
aspiration and voluntary pledges the violation of which is subject to few if 
any sanctions and virtually no actual accountability. 12 It is simply not useful 
to think of attorneys in private practice in any other way because when we 
do we perpetuate our stay in a non-existent dimension bordering on The 
Twilight Zone. 
The state of the legal profession is embarrassing. The client has be-
come an object for far too many lawyers, a monetizable asset to be used and 
II. William C. Cobb, WCCI: The Toxic Ten Assumptions of the Legal Profession, 
WCCI, INC., http://www.cobb-consulting.com/doctoxic.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2003). 
Cobb, a management consultant to law firms, lists the "toxic ten" as follows: 
!d. 
1. Effort is equal to value. The number of billable hours is a primary driver of 
profitability. 
2. Consumers will always need lawyers to interpret the law. Lawyers have a mo-
nopoly on the interpretation of the law. 
3. The lawyer, as a supplier, determines what is value added service. Not the client. 
4. Leverage of other lawyers is the key to law firm profitability. 
5. Young lawyers want to work for law firms and become owners. 
6. The practice of law is a profession and not a business. 
7. The quality of legal services is based upon the experience and expertise of the 
lawyer. 
8. The needs of the market have nothing to do with the strategy and structure for 
the delivery of legal services. The lawyers define the structure for the delivery of 
legal services. 
9. What lawyers have done in the past is the practice oflaw. 
I 0. The practice of law will always be regulated by the courts. 
12. An interesting approach is found in HALT'S 2002 Lawyer Discipline Report 
Card. Halt-Lawyer Accountability, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reform _projects/lawyer_ 
accountability/report_card/summary_of_findings.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). HALT's 
2002 Lawyer Discipline Report Card: 
/d. 
reveals a system of self-regulation that is badly broken and in need of urgent re-
form. If an attorney discipline agency in this country imposes any discipline, more 
often than not it takes the form of a minor secretly dispensed reprimand. While 
some jurisdictions are beginning to make their disciplinary services better known 
to the public, many states remain hopelessly stranded in the dark ages, without 
websites or listings in local telephone directories. Agencies deprive consumers of 
basic information about their lawyer's discipline history. In many states, discipli-
nary hearings are held in secret and a few jurisdictions forbid even the person who 
filed the complaint to attend. Many consumers fear that if they submit grievances, 
their lawyers may sue them, and when individuals do have the courage to file a 
complaint, state "gag rules" punish them with fines and imprisonment if they speak 
about the grievance. State agencies delay filing formal charges against attorneys 
and if a hearing regarding a lawyer's ethical violations does occur, the judge and 
jury consists of fellow lawyers. 
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sucked dry of resources for the lawyers' ends for reasons having nothing to 
do with the duty of service to the client and the client's best interests. 13 Cli-
ents are fungible commodities from which lawyers extract as much revenue 
as possible regardless of client interests, needs, or welfare. This is an obvi-
ous violation of the oft-proclaimed values represented by the roles of coun-
selor and advocate on which we ground ethical claims and proclaim our 
right to self-regulate. The point argued here is that lawyers have betrayed 
their clients, are incapable of self-regulation, and that an entirely new sys-
tem of civil accountability needs to be put in place that is not wholly con-
trolled by the bench and bar. 14 
PART I: TELLING THE STORY OF LAWYERS' "ETHICS" THROUGH EXAMPLES 
My position about abandoning the system of legal ethics and substitut-
ing a new civil accountability system to better protect clients is not the re-
sult of a theoretical academic critique. Based on a diverse professional ex-
perience, years of teaching, consulting and research, it is clear that lawyers 
fail clients on a regular basis and that in most instances the client is unaware 
of what has occurred. Even if aware, the ordinary client has no real recourse 
against his or her former lawyer. One element of the failure is that in many 
instances clients never fully understand what the case is about, what it will 
cost over time, or what its positive or negative economic value will be. Nor 
are they educated about the outcome probabilities. They retain a lawyer, and 
in doing so have little choice but to trust in the lawyer's presumed profes-
sionalism. As suggested in the examples that follow, too often that trust is 
betrayed. 15 
13. For wide-ranging analysis of the decline in the integrity of the legal profession, 
see RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
SERVICES (2008); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: 
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of 
an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911 (1996). 
14. A year 2000 report by the American Bar Association (ABA) analyzed the rates 
of lawyer discipline on a state-by-state basis. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER DISC., ABA, 
2000 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2000). Arkansas imposed sanctions of some 
sort on slightly less than two percent of its lawyer population in 2000 while Ohio trailed the 
field with sanctions on only 0.13 percent of the practicing bar, a total of 50 sanctions on a 
lawyer population of 38,549. !d. at 10-34. Other examples are Pennsylvania 0.26 percent, 
Washington, D.C. 0.19 percent, and California 0.45 percent. !d. 
15. Many lawyers are attempting to insulate themselves from client lawsuits against 
them for unsatisfactory performance. See Lawyers Hide From Lawsuits, NEWSMAX.COM, 
December I, 2000, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2000/11/30/205206.shtml. 
The article states: 
Lawyers are quick to sue almost anyone except other lawyers, a lawyers' pub-
lication says. 
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With these considerations in mind, the following examples are offered 
to provide a sense of just how brutal and unprofessional the private practice 
oflaw can be. Among lawyers' main assets are their time, quality of experi-
ence, and knowledge. The problem is that time is finite and can be made 
elastic only to a limited extent by legitimate means. The ideal of high quali-
ty client representation assumes, however, that lawyers will be able to de-
vote the necessary energy and time to the client's needs required to produce 
the best outcomes. The reality is considerably different. Far too often law-
yers lack the skills, values, and principles to actually fulfill their profession-
al and ethical responsibilities. This means that such lawyers "muddle 
through" cases and transactions with failures to do needed things due to lack 
of experience or knowledge as well as billing for unnecessary or shoddy 
work for which clients are charged while receiving no benefit. 
But while lack of skills and knowledge cause professional shortcom-
ings, even when lawyers possess the skills and knowledge essential for 
competent representation, they often fail to apply them to the dispute or 
transaction due to time conflicts, costs, and the demands of cases being 
handled for other clients. While for clients the dispute or transaction for 
which they seek representation is of paramount importance, for the lawyer it 
is only one item in a bundle of legal matters for which he or she has accept-
ed responsibility. Considerations of cost, available time, competing de-
mands, and the like will often mean that the lawyer fails to properly or fully 
evaluate the case or take action of a kind that increases the probability of a 
positive outcome for the client. 
While incompetence and neglect therefore present one set of issues, in 
an unfortunate number of instances even skilled lawyers act in ways that 
disserve their clients by incurring needless costs that work to the attorney's 
financial benefit through higher fees. The tension is caused by the fact that 
lawyers are in business and need the fees provided by clients to operate that 
business. This requires that the lawyer be able to "sell" prospective clients 
!d. 
Lawyers Weekly USA reported Thursday that a growing number of lawyers 
are putting fine print in fee agreements shielding them from being sued by a client 
if they botch a case. 
The national newspaper for small law firms said lawyers instead prefer that 
such disputes go to private arbitration because arbitration is faster and cheaper, de-
cisions are often made by other lawyers rather than juries, and there's no public 
record. 
Such "arbitration clauses" have raised questions of ethics and have themselves 
become the subject of litigation in some states. 
"The growing practice of lawyers of preventing themselves from being sued 
by a client for negligence raises some serious ethical questions," said Thomas F. 
Harrison, publisher of the weekly newspaper and its Web site. 
"It is certainly ironic that some would take away this right from their clients." 
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on the services to be provided. As in any sale of products or services, there 
is a clear difference between the lawyer's persuasion of the potential con-
sumer of legal services to agree to buy the services and the actual provision 
of the promised services. At the stage in which the lawyer is attempting to 
persuade the potential consumer of legal services to enter into an agreement 
to buy the services, the lawyer is operating as a seller, just as is so with any 
other purveyor of goods or services. 
If a lawyer feels there is a reasonably viable case, he or she becomes a 
"sales person." This includes seeking to close the deal so that the potential 
"asset" does not walk out the door to work out a deal with another lawyer. 
This will cause lawyers at the initial "sales" phase of the client-acquisition 
interaction to overstate the potential outcomes that can be achieved and un-
derstate the costs and risks of achieving the clients' goals. Many lawyers 
inevitably fall prey to the human tendency to paint a rosier picture than 
might be justified. 
Fees and expenses are a critical part of evaluating the realistic out-
come potential of a case, as opposed to abstract possibilities of what might 
be obtained under a best-case scenario. The reality should be explained to 
clients in clear and down-to-earth language, but lawyers who are attempting 
to convince a client to sign up with them understandably do not want to 
scare off clients who represent thousands of dollars in billable hours or po-
tentially lucrative contingent fees. Many lawyers therefore have a tendency 
to be vague or misleading about the real costs of their services or the proba-
bility of a favorable outcome. 
The other part of the sales pitch is that the lawyer's ability to help may 
be overstated to "hook" the client into buying legal services from the law-
yer. Where a client has money to pay fees or the case is one in which it is 
highly probable that some money will be forthcoming because of insurance 
or some other source of revenue, lawyers have an unconscious incentive to 
overstate the beneficial outcomes they can achieve for their clients because 
there is a guaranteed source for their fee. 
There are economies of scale depending on the size of the practice, the 
types and diversity of cases being handled, the lawyer's experience, the 
quality of support staff, and other demands made on the lawyer's time. 16 
The economies of scale tend to be less available to solo practitioners and 
lawyers operating in micro-firm contexts, although even as the scale of the 
operation increases with firm size and resources, there is no guarantee that 
16. Technology and innovation are altering the economy of scale efficiencies for 
some newer "tech-savvy" graduates who are using technology and the Internet to drastically 
reduce the costs of running a law office even to the extent of establishing a "virtual office." 
See, e.g., the example presented in Anika Anand, Law Grads Going Solo and Loving It, 
MSNBC.COM, June 20, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.cornlid/43442917/ns/business-
careers/t/law-grads-going-solo-loving-it/. 
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the quality of service rendered to clients improves because in many instanc-
es the improvements in operating efficiency are directed more toward max-
imizing the firm's profits than to improving client service. 17 
A result of a lack of efficiencies due to inadequate scale and the need 
to spread fmite services across as many paying clients as can be obtained is 
that each client's case receives less than optimal attention. This has a direct 
impact on how the lawyer treats the cases in terms of assessing the value of 
a positive resolution to the client contrasted with the value to the lawyer as 
represented by the need to spread professional time across a range of clients. 
The settlement value of cases being handled in such a milieu are more likely 
to be influenced by considerations that tend to protect the lawyer's business 
needs rather than achieving the best outcome for clients. Similarly, in many 
instances the intensity and thoroughness of case preparation for trial is con-
siderably below what might be considered the best professional standard. 
For these reasons the ideal paradigm of how a client's case should be han-
dled is an impossible dream for most cases and clients as well as lawyers. 18 
17. Solo and small-scale law firm practitioners are disproportionately sanctioned for 
professional violations relative to their counterparts in larger firms. A study by the California 
State Bar, for example, revealed that ninety-five percent of the investigations opened by the 
Bar (and ninety-eight percent of completed cases) were aimed at solo and small firm (fewer 
than ten) lawyers even though lawyers in those categories were only fifty-six percent of the 
lawyer population. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF 
DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL LAW FIRMS AND 
LARGE SIZE LAW FIRMS 7 (June 2001), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=OydXJk36ys4%3D&tabid=224&mid=l 
534. 
18. A brief but powerful description is offered in Matt Brown, Managing Caseload, 
Aug. 8, 2011, http:/lbrownandlittlelaw.com/2011/08/08/managing-caseload/. As a young 
lawyer Brown contacted a number of lawyers in order to determine what kind of caseload 
was optimal and consistent with reasonable earnings and professional quality. ld. He relates 
some frightening information: 
Id 
I also spoke with lawyers who built their practices around court-appointed cli-
ents and only occasionally took a private client. For the most part, they blew the 
public defenders away as far as numbers go. One lady bragged to me about having 
400 appointments in one year alone, some of which were capital cases. I was ex-
tremely disturbed, and believe it or not, that isn't the highest number I've heard. A 
month or two ago, I contacted a court-appointed lawyer before taking over a case 
from him. He was irked that I called and wasted his time, and he informed me that 
he had no clue who the client was anyway because he has 1200 different clients on 
his caseload. 
Public defenders and tum-and-burn contract lawyers weren't the place to 
look, but the people who had my dream practice were no better as a guide. They 
had very few clients, but they were all bigger cases. If I'd have taken so few cli-
ents, I'd have starved with the types of cases I did in the beginning. On top of that, 
they handled the kinds of cases I had no business touching fresh out of law school. 
Without any perfect example to follow, I did my best to set limits on my caseload 
and hoped that one day I'd be busy enough to worry about that kind of thing. 
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The only situations in which something akin to total devotion and prepara-
tion is possible is with very deep pocket clients (generally large corpora-
tions) in high-stakes disputes, or government lawyers in a well staffed agen-
cy capable of devoting the necessary time, resources, and staff to the con-
flict. This still does not guarantee quality of service but increases the likeli-
hood that it will occur. 
A. Case # 1: "Playing" with a Dispute Until Fees Are Maximized 
An example of the chasm between wishing how lawyers and clients 
behaved and their actual behavior is provided by a lawyer who sent me a 
note in response to an article I wrote about professionalism. He explained 
that in a case where he was co-lead counsel for plaintiffs in a bus accident in 
which twenty-two people died and twenty-one were injured that: 
We tried early on to get the various defendants interested in settlements, but it 
quickly became clear that they were more interested in doing everything possible 
to avoid settlement, so they could milk the case for as much as they could. By the 
time my involvement ended, the three major defense firms involved had probably 
billed something in the neighborhood of $2.0 million each [$6 million total] to 
their clients. 19 
Such profit-seeking behavior dominates the examples provided here and 
takes many guises depending on the nature of the case and the available 
resources the client brings into the representation. 
It is not uncommon for lawyers to drag out cases well beyond what is 
necessary in order to collect high fees through maximization of billable 
hours. This tendency is widespread.20 I consulted on a federal court case in 
Wyoming against a prosecutor in which the State had allocated funds to pay 
the fees of the prosecutor's lawyers. While there were hints related to sever-
al low-ball offers during depositions, I suggested to the plaintiffs lawyers 
that nothing would be of much consequence until the prosecutor's attorneys 
had worked their way through the state's authorized fee for their work. 
When the point was reached where the lawyers would have to begin serious 
preparation for the twice rescheduled trial, an offer appeared that was two 
and a half times what had been suggested earlier. The case was promptly 
settled. 
19. Charles Colvin letter to author 1 (November 18, 2003) (on file with author). 
20. For an exposure of abusive billing practices among some large corporate firms, 
see RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE 
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERJCA 232-55 (1996) (Chapter 7, "The 'BUTS' Principle" [Bill 
Until They Squawk]). Nader & Smith indicate that typical abuses include billing unworked 
hours, senior partners billing at their high rate for the work of junior personnel, advising 
clients not to accept settlements that are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking un-
necessary depositions, and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients can't accurately 
monitor what has been done. /d. at 239. 
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B. Case# 2: "De-Legalizing" a Dispute and Considering the Human Costs 
This approach is reflected in a situation where a trustee of a family 
foundation derived from the trustee's sister's estate found herself responsi-
ble for pursuing the deceased sister's former husband for embezzlement of 
approximately $90,000 in estate assets. A court had approved a settlement 
and repayment plan, but the man was not honoring his agreement. A year 
and a half was taken up with hearings seeking enforcement and sanctions, 
broken promises, and lawyer fees. The trust's lawyer was quite willing to 
keep pursuing the derelict and alcoholic former husband, and the legalities 
of the situation were clear. 
But the process was not only expensive from the perspective of the 
lawyer's fees that were being drawn from the trust's corpus, it was also 
causing the trustee, her sister's children, and family tremendous stress. The 
former brother-in-law was sinking into depression, could not hold a job and 
simply didn't care what effects his actions were having on his children or 
the family. Or he was so deep into his addiction that he couldn't alter his 
behavior. It was obvious that even if the funds were ultimately repaid it 
would take years of expensive legal action involving repeated return to 
court to enforce its orders. The trustee sought my counseling, and after a 
process in which we laid out the goals, costs, and full range of financial and 
human consequences, she decided to simply write off the remaining loss 
and save legal fees that were likely to become as high as the amount owed 
by the defendant. This removed the stresses on the children and family. In 
essence the decision was made to "de-legalize" the dispute and give greater 
weight to the human consequences of the conflict. 
C. Case# 3: Stirring the "Pot" to Keep Controversy Going 
The spirit of ethics and duties owed to clients faces significant obsta-
cles in a profession where unfounded litigation and questionable claims and 
assertions are supposed to be ethical violations. It takes an immoral person 
to deliberately accuse another of reprehensible conduct that the accuser 
knows the individual didn't do or about which the accuser has done no in-
vestigation in an effort to validate a client's claims against others. Such in-
vestigation in an effort to gain at least preliminary validation of the asserted 
behavior is essential because the stresses of conflict often produce a psycho-
logical mindset in which clients are willing to claim facts exist that work to 
their advantage. It is not enough for a lawyer to blindly accept whatever 
claims a client asserts. 21 
21. See, e.g., Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. 430 (2008), in which an attorney filed suit 
for conversion based solely on his client's assertion. Even though it does not happen often, 
the case stands for the proposition that an attorney can possibly be sanctioned and required to 
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One lesson I try to provide law students is that clients cannot be trust-
ed to tell the truth. This reflects a variety of client "sins." Some clients in-
tentionally fabricate in order to improve their leverage against an opponent 
or to punish persons. Many exaggerate in order to strengthen their case. 
Others simply reconstruct whatever happened in a way that rationalizes 
their own behavior and puts it in a positive light while denigrating that of 
others. One lawyer raises the problem of vile allegations among the divorce 
bar, where there is a "popular perception that hot-button issues can drive a 
spouse into submission. Child abuse. Incest. Adultery. Claims for all these 
are on the rise, and they are often unfounded."22 
Consider the likelihood that lawyers (and clients) who are willing to 
accuse others of such terrible behavior can be expected to engage in good 
faith negotiation and mediation in disputed contexts where there is little or 
no authority to keep them in check. Lawyers who make baseless charges 
knowingly, maliciously, or with reckless disregard of the truth of the allega-
tions simply to gain an advantage are "scum" who should at least be sus-
pended or disbarred in the most serious instances. While "all's fair in love 
and war," there are ethical limits to such behavior in the practice of law. Of 
course those "limits" appear highly ephemeral since there are surprisingly 
few instances where lawyers have been sanctioned for reckless or intention-
al distortions of fact involving false allegations for which the attorney has 
no factual basis or good faith reason to believe in the legitimacy of the as-
sertions. 23 
Using such allegations imposes a heavy burden on those targeted and 
can ruin reputations and lives. If a client is in the position of the targeted 
person, how does he or she disprove an allegation of this sort that doesn't 
depend on a single specific episode for which the accused may or may not 
be fortunate enough to have an alibi? To the extent the assertions involve 
alleged behavior that would have taken place in private venues, how does 
pay legal fees and expenses for filing a frivolous claim if the attorney failed to conduct a 
reasonable investigation into the facts. See also Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th 
Cir. 1987), in which an attorney was held to be responsible to a third party who relied on an 
opinion letter based on factual claims the lawyer did not investigate but for which he accept-
ed the client's word. Although the good faith duty to investigate facts exists, such cases are 
rare. 
22. Kim Isaac Eisler, The Truth About Divorce Lawyers: It's Hard to Find Lawyers 
Both Civilized and Fair to Clients Who Need a Divorce. Here's Why, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 
1995, at 128. 
23. In describing Washington D.C.'s top divorce lawyers, Eisler identified forty 
lawyers considered to be the best at handling a divorce in an effective but civilized manner. 
/d. It also described ten others, ones labeled "bombers" regarded as the best at what they do 
and stating that: "What these ten others often do is torment the spouses of their clients. They · 
sometimes are referred to as 'bombers' or 'sharks."' /d. "Bombers" and "sharks" also get 
away with tormenting the opposing clients, in part because no one wants to take on the psy-
chological stresses involved in dealing with these "legal terrorists." 
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one respond to such accusations? Obviously charges that someone has en-
gaged in vile behavior have foreseeable negative consequences as well as 
operate as powerful sources of leverage for the accuser to the point that 
even baseless allegations can bring the person to his or her knees and lead to 
capitulation in negotiations. 
Prior to a lawyer making assertions that an opposing party has en-
gaged in reprehensible behavior, it is reasonable to ask what factual and 
evidentiary support exists that entitles the attorney to make the accusation. 
This raises the question of what are the threshold investigative responsibili-
ties of a lawyer that should be required before making serious allegations of 
corrupt and/or criminal behavior against another person. One approach that 
might limit the behavior is to allow defamation and malicious prosecution 
suits for situations in which such allegations can be shown to be reckless, 
and to impose fines and civil liability on lawyers who assert ungrounded 
claims for which they cannot provide legitimate evidence. 
D. Case# 4: Failing to Anticipate Potential Disputes in Negotiating the Sale 
of a Business 
In designing transactions one of a lawyer's core responsibilities is fig-
uring out how clients can achieve their personal and institutional objectives 
with the least avoidable risk, and through non-adversarial, forward-looking 
strategies. This approach can help to create a preventive strategy by design-
ing a client's action plan together with identifying potential legal hot spots 
that can be avoided or minimized with careful planning. This involves 
avoiding risks by doing periodic legal checkups for on-going client situa-
tions in an effort to identify danger areas or uncover potential problems of 
which the client may not be aware. Preventive law approaches can be very 
important for clients. 
Dispute resolution certainly involves the goals of dispute anticipation 
and avoidance. The obligation of the lawyer as drafter and counselor is to 
design transactions in ways that anticipate potential conflicts. This includes 
ensuring that terms are crafted in ways so that reasonably predictable mat-
ters of disagreement over realistic eventualities that could impact the 
agreement's functioning are taken into consideration in ways that avoid or 
minimize their impact if they do occur. 
The key to what might be termed "anticipatory" and "avoidance" dis-
pute resolution is to identify potential disputes upfront and draft the transac-
tion in a way that avoids or minimizes their existence or impact. A core 
responsibility of lawyers is to ensure that there are not pitfalls and traps in 
the agreements they negotiate for clients. This means that inconsistent con-
ditions that create confusion or that work against their clients must be 
avoided at all costs. In the sale of the business described below, there was a 
failure to do this on multiple levels by the seller's attorney. The reason 
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might have been that the negotiating lawyer lacked the experience or intelli-
gence to understand how businesses function or know where there was a 
greater likelihood of breach or conflict. 
Negotiating a complex business transaction requires a significant 
range of knowledge cutting across numerous areas of law. Many lawyers 
could be acting in complete good faith in terms of their intention to help the 
client but lack the experience to understand the processes sufficiently to 
know what is needed to protect their clients. It is not bad faith, but incompe-
tence. Other lawyers, and this was most likely the situation in the sale of a 
business example described below, are working within a firm where there 
are sufficient resources and a mix of experience such that the knowledge 
does exist but for some reason was not applied to a particular transaction. In 
such situations the client, as here, pays tens of thousands of dollars only to 
receive poor service from the lawyers responsible for protecting his rights. 
This client paid the fees, was represented negligently and inadequately, and 
suffered significant financial loss including salary, additional legal fees, and 
loss ofthe value of the deal involving the sale of the business. 
This is where the lawyer's job as counselor comes into play in the 
transactional realm. It should be clear from this example that the function of 
counselor involves a diverse array of knowledge. The knowledge is not only 
about the technical elements of law in a variety of complex areas including 
contracts, tax, non-compete provisions, financial recourse, and other mat-
ters, but the practical considerations and dynamics of the context within 
which one is operating. A lawyer negotiating agreements involving business 
relationships must have sufficient experience to understand the conditions 
and dynamics of the business world in the area in which the agreements are 
being negotiated. If a lawyer lacks that knowledge or fails to apply it in a 
specific transaction, then the client is put at risk because the terms of the 
agreement are being defined in a vacuum without context. If the other par-
ty's lawyer understands such nuances, then that person may be able to craft 
the transaction in a way that allows his lawyer to take advantage of the defi-
cient or negligent lawyer's client-as occurred in this example. 
An example of a failure to take this approach was brought to me in the 
context of an agreement involving the sale of a business, the conditions of 
continuing employment of the selling owner, and two incompatible non-
compete clauses in the agreement to sell and the continuing employment 
contract. The seller's lawyer clearly didn't bother to understand or explain 
to his client the real import of the inconsistent provisions. Nor did the law-
yer identify or counsel the client on the fact that the conditions of employ-
ment could be manipulated by the buyer to justify the seller's discharge 
based on factors completely outside the control of the seller as a continuing 
employee of the new owner. 
The result was that after one year, the seller's employment was not on-
ly terminated without notice, but the buyer asserted the primacy of the non-
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compete provision contained in the agreement of sale over the contract for 
employment. The seller's lawyers who had drafted and negotiated the 
agreements for sale of the business and continuing employment "stone-
walled" their former client (seller) on the issue of their numerous oversights 
and sloppiness even though the agreements were replete with other exam-
ples of the lawyers' negligence and incompetence. These included a buyer's 
liability provision that placed liability for any breach solely in a newly cre-
ated corporation whose assets were limited to only those of the purchased 
entity. It also subordinated the seller's right to continuing payments for the 
sale through a complicated mishmash of superficially ambiguous terms. 
Properly understood, it all meant that the seller faced the real possibility of 
never receiving full compensation for the sale of the business. In fact that is 
exactly what happened. 
Ironically, if we analyze this situation from the perspective of the op-
posing client and its lawyers, there are several insights that can be obtained, 
and they do not bode well for the "moral" dimension of law practice or dis-
pute resolution where lawyers are supposed to be pure of heart and not take 
advantage of others' ignorance or vulnerabilities-including that of the oth-
er party's incompetent lawyers. From the perspective of the buyer of the 
business in this example, the agreements that were signed basically obtained 
the business for almost nothing. 
Any financial obligation was essentially being funded by a leveraged-
buyout in which the revenues from the acquired business were used to meet 
any obligation to the seller. If those revenues for any reason became inade-
quate, including failures on the part of the buyer, the seller took the loss 
while the buyer (who re-allocated some of the business to another corporate 
entity) remained whole. Not only was the buyer's financial risk limited to 
the revenues of the acquired business, the agreement contained language 
subordinating the seller's right to payment for the sale to complex financial 
arrangements the buyer negotiated separately with a bank. 
One of the most indefensible aspects of the "deal" was that even if the 
seller was terminated as an employee for no fault of his own, the incon-
sistent non-compete clauses created an uncertain situation in which the buy-
er appeared to have the power to prevent the seller from working in the 
same industry for a period of three years even though terminated and even 
though payments for purchase of the business had been suspended. Putting 
aside the morality of the situation, the buyer essentially obtained a function-
ing business for free even though on paper the sale was for something above 
$3 million. 
Following his employment termination the seller attempted to meet 
with the buyer without success, sought a waiver of the non-compete agree-
ment, had difficulty obtaining employment in the industry due to the non-
compete provision, and received no further payments for sale of the busi-
ness due to alleged revenue shortfalls that appear to have been caused by 
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asset transfers by the buyer to another of its corporate identities. Ultimately, 
after research on the various issues the buyer was provided with an analysis 
concerning the weakness of its non-compete provision under relevant state 
law and the questionable and possibly bad faith actions it appears to have 
taken to manipulate the businesses' revenues in ways that arguably violated 
the sales and employment agreements. It backed off the non-compete provi-
sion and the seller gained other employment in the industry shortly thereaf-
ter. ' 
E. Case# 5: Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases with the Clients' Interests at 
Heart and for a Fair Fee 
In Ohio, the state is encouraging the expansion of oil and gas well 
drilling, including in state parks. There is also significant attention being 
paid to leases for drilling in smaller farms in Southern Ohio since that area 
has long demonstrated ample reserves. In several counties in Southeast 
Ohio, lawyers are representing and seeking to represent small farmers in the 
oil and gas leases of their farms. They are recruiting clients and recom-
mending that they sign extremely complex long-term leases created by an 
industry that is famous for one-sided dealing. There are several problems 
with this, but among the most important are the lease price and the legal 
import of the agreements, including tax and asset planning aimed at creating 
maximum benefit for the farmers. 
Added to this is the fact that at least some of the lawyers are charging 
a two percent fee on the total lease amount rather than a reasonable hourly 
rate that more accurately reflects the five or ten hours they may have put 
into the transaction. Since the lawyers are not drafting the agreements sup-
plied by the oil companies' lawyers and are mainly just recommending to 
the lessors that they accept the contracts while spending relatively little time 
on a matter that does not involve the risk of no return that underlies the jus-
tification for contingent fees, the use of a percentage fee arrangement ap-
pears unreasonable. If the lease amount spread over five years is $500,000 
and the lawyer receives two percent, then the fee is $10,000 for five or ten 
hours of no-risk work. This raises issues of whether the fee is reasonable 
when looking at the time involved as well as the comparative results 
achieved. 
There are other questions raised by the fact that some lawyers appear 
to be accepting a lease price per acre that is considerably lower than can be 
obtained through actual negotiation with the potential lessee. One small 
farmer with roughly 200 acres to lease was referred to a lawyer located out 
of the county who specialized in oil and gas leases and agreed to handle the 
matter for an hourly fee of $175. He negotiated a price per acre of $5,000, 
150 percent higher than the norm of $2,000 per acre being recommended by 
the local lawyers, along with a twenty percent royalty fee on production. He 
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also offered recommendations on fmancial planning and income protection 
for the lease payments and adjusted some terms of the proposed lease. This 
demonstrates not only the effect of expertise in an area of specialized trans-
actional law, but a sense of putting the client's interests at the heart of the 
representation. Unfortunately one or both of these considerations is not al-
ways present in lawyers' representation of their clients. 
F. Case # 6: Client Expectations and a Less Than Productive Mediation 
Clients often do not understand how mediation works. In a case where 
after twenty years of employment a college faculty member's renewable 
three-year teaching contract was not renewed due to what he considered a 
violation of his federal statutory rights relating to a physical disorder and a 
failure by the college charged with the education of Roman Catholic priests 
and the governing Catholic Diocese to make reasonable accommodations, 
the dispute was submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). The agency referred it to mediation. My role was mainly to 
serve as a counselor since I was out of state. A local law firm was retained 
to provide direct representation. The client was excited about the prospect 
of mediation and the possibility of the year-old dispute finally being re-
solved since he had been reduced to doing odd jobs to earn money. An im-
portant concern was the client's expectation about the probability of what 
would occur through mediation. 
In attempting to bring the client "down to earth" about the likelihood 
of a satisfactory mediation outcome, I communicated that he should not get 
excited about the fact that the Diocese agreed to participate in the EEOC 
mediation. I explained that this did not mean the Diocese was beginning to 
take his claim seriously in the sense that the mediation would produce an 
outcome of the kind he wanted. In many instances a party agrees to partici-
pate in mediation for reasons having nothing to do with an interest in set-
tlement and that can in fact even be contrary to any desire to resolve the 
dispute through mediation. These reasons include not wanting to seem un-
reasonable and to avoid alienating the authoritative decision maker (the 
EEOC in this instance) because such an attitude could make the agency 
decide the Diocese needs to be taught a lesson. Mediation can also be seen 
as a time-consuming process that a party (usually the defendant) uses to 
drive up the plaintiffs legal fees. 24 They are counting on the fact that the 
plaintiff isn't working full time at this point and likely needs money. It is all 
part of a classic defense "siege" strategy of "softening up" the opposition by 
24. On how these factors operate in strategic contexts involving the processes of 
trial, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, see DAVID BARNHIZER, THEW ARRIOR LAWYER: 
POWERFUL STRATEGIES FOR WINNING LEGAL BATTLES (1997). 
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imposing greater costs and doing everything to drag out the case while the 
claimant suffers more expenditures and losses. 
The reasons opponents agree to participate in mediations also include 
using the pretense of being interested in a possible settlement in order to 
draw out the critical points of the opponent's case, and using the interaction 
to send messages to the opponent about how they intend to approach the 
case. Mediation can be used to send false messages to opponents about the 
strengths or weaknesses of a case and can help to focus the opponent's law-
yers on the key points they will have to deal with in arbitration or trial if 
things reach that point. Mediation can be used to assess the opposing party 
to determine how they might come across to subsequent fact finders. 25 
The point is that agreeing to mediation does not at all mean a party has 
any interest in settling the case, certainly not at that point and perhaps not at 
all. In this case the Diocese had some reason to reach a resolution. This in-
cludes protection of what is called the Ministerial Exception Doctrine be-
cause the factual situation involved is one in which they could fear that the 
increasingly challenged Doctrine granting religious institutions a protected 
status in hiring and firing decisions otherwise subject to federal and state 
employment protection law could be narrowed further by courts. 
In fact the application of the Ministerial Exception Doctrine has re-
cently been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.26 The Su-
preme Court recognized the application of the Doctrine on a relatively nar-
row set of facts in which the employee clearly held herself out as having 
ministerial responsibilities and even received tax breaks based on that sta-
tus, led prayer sessions, received lengthy instruction in ministerial duties, 
and was "called" by the congregation. Those facts do not appear related to 
this situation, and this leaves open the extent to which the Doctrine applies 
in this particular case. Even with the Court upholding the Doctrine as it now 
stands in a narrow sense, there is a significant factual dispute in this case 
about whether the client had any employment duties of the kind that brings 
him within the Doctrine's scope. Settling relatively early also includes the 
avoidance of significant legal fees and costs that would have to be paid if 
the case goes to court. This potentially includes its own expenses and the 
plaintiffs fees if the Diocese were found to have violated the law on rea-
sonable accommodation. While no one can know precisely what the costs 
and fees would be in total, the Diocese should be thinking of an exposure as 
high as $250,000 to $500,000 if this case were actually played out all the 
way to the end through litigation. 
The college's admission that the claimant was a fine teacher and that 
his problems were related to infrequent tardiness on some administrative 
25. !d. 
26. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012). 
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details undermines the defendant Diocese's position because an easy ac-
commodation would have been to eliminate the administrative responsibili-
ties as department chair and assign that role to another faculty member. Al-
so, the timing of their actions creates a risk on their part that their actions 
will be seen as bad faith and malicious, as is the offer to only provide the 
claimant with a "neutral" letter of recommendation after two decades of 
what they admitted in writing was excellent teaching. A "neutral" letter is 
an obvious red flag and "kiss of death" for your possible future employment 
as a teacher. This signifies a troubling type of malicious behavior that, after 
I was made aware of it as their lawyer, I would have to tell them is pretty 
creepy and capable of alienating a jury if it comes to that. 
One of the reasons I cautioned the client about expecting any positive 
resolution through mediation was that the lawyer for the Diocese had a rep-
utation as being uncooperative and hard-nosed while "low-balling" cases 
and seeing any concession on her part as weakness. She was also a staff 
lawyer for the defendant Diocese and as such did not incur hourly fee costs 
for her representation. In such a situation it appeared likely that her settle-
ment authority was capped and that she took great pride in achieving rela-
tively minimal settlements. 
After several hours of presentation of positions and back and forth 
discussions with the mediator, he indicated that he would support a 
$100,000 settlement and that he would write his report to the parties and 
EEOC within the next few days. He failed to do so and the Diocese's staff 
lawyer indicated she would never go above $50,000. The troubling thing 
was that the mediation program was based at a Catholic law school and, 
oddly, no other mediators submitted an indication of interest prior to the 
agency's choice of mediator. While the EEOC seemed to agree that there 
might be a potential conflict of interest in this case, it took almost a year to 
issue a finding that the situation involved the Ministerial Exception Doc-
trine in which an employee of a church whose duties were "ministerial" 
rather than secular was not protected by federal statutes relating to discrimi-
nation in employment. Since the plaintiff simply taught a course in church 
history at a Catholic seminary, this opinion appears pretty close to invalid 
on its face. In any event, the general issue of the Ministerial Exception Doc-
trine's scope and application was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court albeit 
in a narrow context, and this inserts an intriguing consideration into the on-
going controversy that is now in federal district court.27 
This indicates there is clearly no magic in mediation. It can be produc-
tive when used well and in good faith but only in certain cases. In many 
instances it simply increases attorney fees and costs to the disadvantage of 
27. ld. 
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plaintiffs who have limited resources. In the above situation the Diocese 
relied on a staff attorney while the claimant who no longer had a teaching 
job paid an hourly fee to his lawyer that by the end of the mediation process 
was $35,000 and quickly grew to more than $40,000. I had suggested 
strongly from the beginning of the process that it would be necessary to file 
suit in federal court because it was the only way to shift the handling of the 
dispute away from staff counsel to expensive lawyers who would impose 
considerably higher costs on the Diocese while bringing in an authoritative 
source of decision making not under its control or influence in the form of 
the judge and potentially the jury if the case were for some reason not set-
tled prior to trial. 
This brings into play the hard reality of legal disputes for clients. In 
this situation I had already done a great deal of pro bono research and anal-
ysis on the case, including demonstrating that factually and legally a major 
element of the probable defense that would be raised by the Diocese, the 
ministerial exception to governmental oversight of its hiring and firing deci-
sions, would not apply in this case. The law firm was also provided with a 
factual analysis that indicated the official who terminated the claimant's 
contract did so with full knowledge of his disability and accelerated the 
termination shortly after he was reminded of the federally-protected disabil-
ity. 
Even with a major part of the factual and legal analysis already pre-
pared, the claimant's law firm ran up a $40,000 bill. At $200 per hour this 
represents 200 hours or five full weeks of billable time at eight hours per 
day. There was no legitimate reason to spend that kind of time when much 
of the factual and legal research work had already been done. Somehow, 
reviewing research and conducting a half-day mediation session generated 
extensive billings that appear to involve a surprising amount of work of 
some kind that produced no positive results. Nor is it obvious why a sub-
stantial proportion of the time was necessary. But at the point where they 
are operating on the "first blush" of a substantial client retainer, lawyers are 
quite adept at filling up time sheets and running up bills through unneces-
sary duplication of work, use of more lawyers than necessary even in a case 
where the limited ability to pay a fee was made obvious from the beginning, 
and using billing "multipliers" in which fifteen or twenty minute billing 
increments were applied even if only five or ten minutes were devoted to 
the dispute. In that situation it is possible for an hour of "real time" to result 
in billings for three or four hours of alleged case work. A client who has 
been informed he is paying for an associate at $200 per hour is unaware the 
effective hourly fee is actually $600 to $800 per hour depending on the bill-
ing sophistication of the lawyer and the law firm's billing increment prac-
tices. 
A result in this case was that the claimant fired the law firm and is in 
the process of seeking new counsel who will accept the case on a contin-
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gency basis. He was assisted by a new firm that, even though it was still 
deciding whether to accept the case, drafted a pro se complaint for the 
claimant and advised him about the procedures involved in filing in federal 
court, which he was able to do one day before the statute of limitations ran. 
He had asked the original firm to draft the pro se complaint for him two 
weeks earlier and received a response only a few days before the deadline 
that they would do so only if he paid a $10,000 retainer prior to receiving 
the service. 
This means that after more than a year of representation that produced 
no positive results and drained the client's resources of more than $40,000, 
the original firm was fully willing to let his claim be rendered moot by the 
running of the statute. The lawyer who had been responsible in the case 
also, for the first time, admitted that he had never actually taken a case like 
this to litigation, even though we had engaged in discussions from the be-
ginning about the probable need for a court filing, and he indicated that 
there was no problem with that. The new firm, even though it had not yet 
made a final decision concerning representation, contributed several days of 
attorney time drafting the pro se complaint in order to protect the claimant, 
demonstrating that there are still some admirable professionals out there. 
G. Case# 7: "Churning" for the Lawyer's Profit 
Wasting client resources under the guise of providing an aggressive 
representation is called "churning." One critic states the "hourly fee system 
is a devilish creature that rewards inefficiency and paralyzes productivity.ms 
Typical abuses include billing unworked hours, senior partners billing at 
their high rate for the work of junior personnel, advising clients not to ac-
cept settlements that are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking un-
necessary depositions, and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients 
can't accurately monitor what has been done.29 
As Lisa Lerman suggests, too many lawyers "chum" cases to maxim-
ize their own earnings rather than to advance their clients' interests. 30 This 
can occur even to the point of convincing clients to tum down reasonable 
settlement offers through disparaging the proposed deal and overestimating 
the probability of a positive outcome to persuade clients to take a chance on 
a significantly greater outcome than may be realistic but represents the law-
yer's "crap shoot" aimed at maximizing a return to himself. In examining 
the behavior of the divorce bar in Washington, D.C., Kim Eisler concludes: 
28. Dianne K. Dailey et al., Alternative Billing Systems: Abandoning Time as a 
Measurable of Value, 27 SPG BRIEF 44 (1998); see also NADER& SMITH, supra note 20. 
29. NADER & SMITH, supra note 20. 
30. Such issues are discussed at length in Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regu-
lation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999). 
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"The beauty of it, from the unscrupulous lawyer's point of view, is that alt-
hough the client is being fleeced, he or she thinks the lawyer is a fierce 
fighter for the cause."31 It is unethical and substandard professional behavior 
for a lawyer to chum a case for personal profit by engaging in unnecessary 
activity that magnifies a client's bill for the lawyer's benefit. The same can 
be said for negotiating a deal with an opposing lawyer that looks good to an 
unsophisticated client forced to rely on the lawyer's "expertise" but which 
the lawyer knows is considerably less than could have reasonably been ob-
tained for the client or considerably more than the client should have had to 
pay to settle a dispute. Not responding to client needs, not being profession-
al in the preparation of a case, not keeping accurate track of work actually 
done, and overbilling all represent unprofessional lawyering. 
Divorce cases are among the worst examples of churning, although in 
my experience bankruptcy is not far behind if there is a remaining asset in 
the bankruptcy estate with value from which fees can be extracted. A few 
months after first retaining a lawyer, clients can be overwhelmed when the 
legal fees in their divorce proceeding have somehow escalated to twenty or 
thirty thousand dollars, plus rapidly ballooning litigation expenses. Too 
many divorce lawyers fight viciously until there are no assets left. Then it is 
time to settle or to sue the clients for unpaid fees incurred "on their behalf." 
Most lawyers are not like this, but too many are. One of the most frustrating 
aspects of law practice that allows this to happen is that the "negotiation 
dance" takes two to do it right. Even if you are trying to settle a case in 
good faith, if you find yourself opposed by a lawyer who is churning the 
case to run up fees, virtually nothing you can do will work because the law-
yer is working in his or her own interest, not the client's. 
H. Case# 8: Billing for Work Not Done 
Churning a case is bad enough. Billing for work not done is reprehen-
sible, fraudulent, and criminal. One of the most brazen examples I have 
encountered involves a business bankruptcy case in which I was involved. 
The lawyer who in theory was representing an opponent but who had actu-
ally been supplanted by that client with a different lawyer the client had 
used in other cases, ended up filing a request for $450,000 in fees in the 
final part of the case. This represented 1,500 hours (or the equivalent of 
37.5 weeks of forty hours of work per week) spent on the case at $300 per 
hour. This lawyer had rarely met with his supposed client, was not involved 
in any of the negotiations, and played no role in agreements reached to set-
tle the case. We opposed the request and the court reduced the fee claim to 
$70,000, which is still pretty good pay for doing nothing. The point is that 
31. Eisler, supra note 22. 
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the audacity of submitting such a preposterous fee claim should in itself 
have been considered a shocking prima facie breach of professional ethics 
sufficient to result in significant sanctions. Yet no sanctions were forthcom-
ing even though the Bankruptcy judge was aware of what had occurred but 
chose not to investigate further. 
I. Case# 9: Totally Failing the Client 
Assume a case in which several individuals insisted they were entitled 
to what my client considered to be fraud-derived payments of approximate-
ly $50,000 each. It should be pointed out that as board members of the 
company involved in the dispute, the two defendants as officers and direc-
tors had already paid themselves over $200,000 each prior to leaving the 
company. We weren't even trying to have them return the clearly question-
able and self-dealing funds they had diverted. I researched the situation, 
wrote an extensive memorandum detailing why there was no obligation and 
explaining that the opponents were in fact potentially liable for damages 
flowing from a wide range of business torts, statutory violations, and fiduci-
ary breaches. 
This memorandum was shared with the opposing lawyer who had 
been initially retained, and to his credit, promptly withdrew from the case. 
But the potential defendant promptly obtained another lawyer who simply 
ignored the facts and issues and demanded payment of the alleged obliga-
tion and announced a two-week deadline or they would file suit. Not want-
ing to be in a defensive position, we filed suit in arbitration a week later 
based on the opponent's threat. The next year was spent running up fees and 
expenses even though it was a situation that could and should have been 
resolved by the opponents walking away from their initial demands. 
During the ensuing year we could not persuade the opposing lawyers 
to engage in any serious settlement discussions. A consequence was that I 
was forced to spend significant time in further investigation and discovery. 
This ironically resulted in the discovery of facts that not only further sup-
ported our claim of fraud, but identified other significant breaches by the 
opposing clients involving the potential for substantial damages related not 
only to the questioned payments they had given themselves, but stock ma-
nipulation. The information came from electronic records provided by the 
opponents and even suggested the possibility of criminal violations. Given 
the substantial amount of time I spent reviewing the electronic records and 
e-mails they provided, I consider it unlikely that the opposing lawyers even 
knew what they contained or what they indicated about their clients' behav-
ior. We remain convinced to this day that the opponents' lawyers were un-
aware of how bad their clients' behavior had been and the extent of their 
potential exposure even though we had provided them with a detailed legal 
and factual brief and other clear signals. 
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By the time of the scheduled arbitration, the opponents' position was 
dire. On the day of the final arbitration hearing, a settlement was reached 
that, valued today, is worth something in the vicinity of [at least] $7.5 mil-
lion in favor of our client. The initial potential offer we offered the oppo-
nents for a walk away low-cost surrender of their bogus $95,000 claim, to 
which it was clear they were not really entitled, ended up as a massive and 
entirely unnecessary loss to those clients. It could have been avoided if their 
lawyers had been operating in their clients' best interests. But it seemed 
clear during the final settlement discussions that they did not understand 
what the case was about even though we had supplied them with detailed 
facts and analysis. They had, on the other hand, almost certainly collected 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees from their clients while ren-
dering entirely substandard representation. Their clients were of course en-
tirely unaware of how badly they had been treated by their "trusted" repre-
sentatives. It was our clear impression that the opposing lawyers had never 
actually read the briefs and key materials we had provided and chose in-
stead to rely on a strategy of bluster, threat, and stonewall. It served the 
lawyers' financial interests but damaged their clients severely. 
Nor was the law firm we engaged as local counsel in this dispute free 
from fee abuse. It assigned a completely inexperienced new lawyer to the 
case. This individual, a young associate with very limited practical experi-
ence but who possessed legal research skills she was pleased to apply far 
beyond what was necessary because it was what she knew how to do, pro-
ceeded to replicate extensive research that we had already provided the firm 
and produce lengthy duplicative memos on that material. The researching 
lawyer's lack of litigation experience resulted in serious and expensive er-
rors that quickly ate up a $15,000 retainer and ended up costing more than 
$60,000 in fees before the case was settled. The more senior lawyer suppos-
edly managing the out-of-state case was apparently "burned out" after sev-
eral decades of practice and made questionable decisions and agreements 
with opponents without discussing them with us. Ultimately both lawyers 
were removed from the case and then from the law firm. The senior partner 
of the firm acknowledged that mistakes had been made and the fee request 
was discounted significantly. 
J. Case # 10: The Irresistible $18,000,000 "Pot of Gold" 
I experienced overbilling and churning conduct by a wide array of 
lawyers when I was appointed a member of a client committee in a bank-
ruptcy case in California. From the clients' perspective the problem was not 
that there was $18,000,000 cash sitting in a bank account, but that all the 
lawyers in Southern California knew about it, including those representing 
the various parties in the case. None of the lawyers could resist the tempta-
tion to "chum" the dispute and process in ways that generated significantly 
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higher fees and delayed the outcome. This was, for example, a case where 
the investors' committee was told initially by its lawyers that everything 
should be resolved in no more than a year to a year and a half. Unfortunate-
ly the four different law firms that were billing against the bankruptcy estate 
dragged things out for more than three years and drained over $4 million 
from the bankruptcy estate before the case was resolved. I went over the 
billing records from the law firms and found them replete with senior law-
yers who otherwise had no connection with the case holding regular "case 
review" sessions, apparently to remind themselves every week or two what 
the dispute was about. These chummy hour-long get-togethers were billed at 
group rates of $2000 per hour and more. 
As suggested in the final paragraph of the immediately preceding ex-
ample, the dismal fact is that it is not only opposing lawyers who are the 
"bad guys." The client committee's own lawyers kept telling us that the case 
was "almost done" and that they had largely completed their work. We later 
found out that the agreements they drafted were incomplete in numerous 
ways. After exiting bankruptcy it was discovered they had neglected to deal 
with several important matters that ended up costing the reconstituted com-
pany a minimum of several hundred thousand dollars. When the issue of 
failing to structure the reorganization in a way that would have allowed the 
new corporate entity to avoid SEC reporting requirements is taken into ac-
count, the cost of the lawyers' omissions after the new company exited 
bankruptcy grew to over $2 million due to added business costs and staffing 
requirements directly related to the public reporting, securities, and auditing 
rules associated with SEC reporting companies. 
The overall essence of the experience from the point of view of those 
who served on the client committee was the exposure to lies, misrepresenta-
tions, false promises, incompetence and massive "churning," and bill pad-
ding. This was not conduct by a single unethical lawyer but conduct that 
occurred across the board on the part of four different law firms whose 
"business" practices conveniently maximized their own return at their cli-
ents' expense. The business model of bankruptcy practice encouraged the 
behavior. In the final billing by the firms prior to finalizing the re-
organization plan, the client committee independently raised an objection to 
the gross over-billing. Rather than attempt to justify their behaviour, the law 
firms involved quickly agreed to reduce their legal bills by ten percent 
across the board. Given all the variables and risks involved in other ap-
proaches, this approach was accepted. What this reveals about lawyers' 
ethical behavior when there is money to be made is, however, both dismal 
and profound. 
After exiting bankruptcy and discovering just how poor a job the law-
yers had done, the restructured company considered pursuing a remedy 
through malpractice, but such litigation would have been time consuming, 
expensive, taken years, and been a diversion of energy and focus from the 
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business at a critical point in its "new life." The decision was made to "play 
the hand" that had been dealt and get on with the business. 
K. Case# 11: A Classic "Day of Trial" Settlement 
The system of litigation-based dispute resolution relies heavily on last 
minute settlements. One of the primary reasons for this is that generally 
both sides have engaged in less than ideal case evaluation and preparation 
but have made it seem as if they are representing the client aggressively 
while maximizing available fees. Clients don't actually know what their 
lawyers have done to prepare a case, and it doesn't require a great deal of 
last minute "flash" to make it seem that a lawyer has been diligent. 
Even when there are authoritative dispute resolution procedures such 
as are represented by binding arbitration and trial, the timing of any negoti-
ated resolution still tends to occur at or near the moment of the formal event 
in which the dispute is to be submitted to the authority of the independent 
decision maker. In some instances this can be justified because in many 
instances it is only when a party understands that the game of "chicken" has 
reached its endpoint that reality comes into play and leverage is maximized. 
It is also true that for many clients who are in the position of the defendant 
party, the lengthy "stretch-out" strategy so often employed in reaching 
agreement at the point of the trial or arbitration hearing is aimed at holding 
onto assets and benefits for as long as possible. 
Delay also involves trying to wear down plaintiffs in order to exhaust 
their assets and to impose psychological and other costs that enhance the 
likelihood of a settlement on the defendants' terms. In some instances assets 
that were sufficient to satisfy all or part of a substantial judgment will have 
been diminished significantly prior to final settlement, trial, or arbitration, at 
best limiting settlement options or generating another costly round of litiga-
tion in an effort to pursue recovery. Those assets may also have gone to pay 
the lawyers' increasing legal fees generated due to the delaying strategies. 
Behavior involving delay or failure to prepare a case adequately or 
evaluate the probable outcome of the dispute is not uncommon. One of the 
most recent examples involved the far too typical "day of trial" settlement 
by two opposing defendants we sued for breach of their duties on a corpo-
rate board involving the diversion of company funds for inappropriate pur-
poses. A year earlier we had given the two individuals and their lawyers a 
chance to walk away from their claim that they were owed a substantial 
amount of money as their final share ofthe contested payments. 
All we received in return was bluster and threats to sue, so we pre-
empted the situation and filed first. Our strategy included a full and trans-
parent sharing of information and claims against the defendants, which we 
discovered later their lawyers had either not read or understood. After a year 
of contentious interaction, on the day when the trial was to begin the de-
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fendants ended up agreeing to a settlement that cost their clients between 
$8-10 million in surrendered stock and options when they could have 
walked away a year earlier simply by abandoning the bogus claim. 
It is difficult to understand what was going on in the minds of the de-
fendants' lawyers other than the desire to obtain a steady flow of legal fees. 
The fees generated for them almost surely added up to somewhere between 
$150,000-$200,000, increasing their clients' out-of-pocket cash losses dra-
matically. They had been provided a full and detailed factual and legal ex-
planation of their clients' exposure to a variety of serious claims that went 
well beyond the immediate dispute and of our intention to pursue them ag-
gressively if they failed to settle. This included evidence of wrongdoing that 
was irrefutable and that came from files produced from their own clients. 
The result was that rather than obtaining the demanded final payments, the 
defendants lost total value in the vicinity of $10 million. 
The line between legal and illegal conduct was obviously blurred for 
one of the opposing lawyers because it was clear from his statements during 
settlement negotiations that he had delayed settlement because he was con-
vinced that our client was planning to engage in the same kind of fraudulent 
stock-price manipulation scheme that his client had done, and that he hoped 
to gain from stock appreciation. His expectation that we would engage in 
fraud and illegal behavior of the kind that we had argued was done by his 
client shaped his unethical settlement strategy. The fact that we had in-
formed him that we were preparing to file a civil RICO action was some-
how ignored. 
But even that was not the end. While one defendant signed the agree-
ment shortly after the "day-of-trial" settlement was reached, the other law-
yer spent another four months dragging his feet after settlement while disa-
greeing and nitpicking until we resubmitted the case for an enforcement 
order and costs. At that point he immediately folded and paid. But the law-
yer made fees during that period. Our local in-state lawyers who were repre-
senting us in the jurisdiction refused to submit the part of our demand that 
sought fees and sanctions from the opposing lawyer for his bad faith even 
though they admitted the opposing lawyer had behaved unethically. 
This raises another serious flaw in the current system of representa-
tion, one that undermines the ability to achieve effective service to clients. 
Because our local law firm feared that a request for sanctions and fees 
would offend other lawyers in the area of their practice, the lawyers did not 
want to pursue a remedy to which our client was clearly entitled. This posi-
tion was taken even though they admitted there was improper delay and bad 
faith on the part of the opposing lawyer. They took this position even while 
they attempted to charge my client for the additional legal fees caused by 
the lawyer's unreasonable delays rather than seek penalties against him. 
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We did not pay the extra fees. We did not pay, but many clients would have 
done so without knowing their lawyers had disserved themY 
L. Case# 12: Delaying Execution of a Settlement in an Effort to Gain the 
Corpus of a Client's Recovery 
A particularly egregious situation was one in which an opposing law-
yer dragged his feet on finalizing a settlement that had been agreed to in 
court because he wanted us to have seventy percent of the 200,000 company 
shares that represented the corpus of the agreement issued to his law firm 
and only thirty percent to his client. He never responded to our request to 
have his client provide written instructions signifying his agreement to such 
a fee arrangement. After more than six months of protracted delay, his client 
contacted the company's CEO and complained about the fact that he had 
not received his shares. It turned out his lawyer had never communicated to 
him about the request to have the bulk of the shares issued to his law firm or 
said anything about our insistence that we receive clear written instructions 
from the client authorizing the action. 
When the opposing client reiterated this to his attorney, the lawyer ap-
parently insisted that he receive the shares and threatened the client with a 
lawsuit for fees if he did not do what the lawyer demanded. The opposing 
client then fired his lawyer and retained another attorney, and the settlement 
was finalized. Given that the shares were restricted securities that had to be 
held a minimum of one year before they could be traded freely, the eventual 
nine month delay inhibited the opposing client's ability to trade the shares at 
his option during a period of rapidly rising value. 
If this were a settlement for $200,000 and a lawyer said to the oppos-
ing side's lawyer, "I demand that you make out three separate checks, one 
for $120,000 to my firm, another for $20,000 to a firm I used, and the third 
for $60,000 to the client on whose behalf I have been working," that oppos-
ing lawyer would say: "You have to be kidding!" We told the lawyer: "This 
is something we will not do. If you do not have a valid written fee agree-
ment with your client Mr. Smith to provide us authorizing the nearly seven-
ty percent fee you are trying to have our client deliver directly to you then 
that is your problem. In any event, as an ethical matter we will not be party 
to such an excessive fee arrangement." 
This was not enough to convince the lawyer to move ahead on what 
had been agreed. The amazing thing was that it turned out he had not ever 
discussed the actual settlement document with his client that we sent shortly 
after the in-court settlement. Nor had he been authorized to instruct us to 
split the shares in the way he demanded. It turned out he had not discussed 
32. There are many other examples. See Bamhizer, supra note 9, at 228-32. 
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the facially unreasonable fee arrangement with his client. When his client 
refused to do what was demanded, he threatened to sue his client for fees 
even while continuing to "represent" the client and demand that he agree to 
the seventy percent legal fee. Given that the value of the developing compa-
ny's shares increased dramatically during this period of controversy and 
delay, it seemed clear that the lawyer wanted to "ride the wave" and receive 
a return approximately 800 percent greater than he would have received in 
relation to the financial value of the shares on the day the initial agreement 
was reached. 
PART II 
A. How Do Lawyers Get Away with Unprofessional Behavior? 
The analysis offered here concludes that the system of lawyer regula-
tion is-at least as applied to clients-broken and not capable of being 
"fixed" through traditional means based on prevailing assumptions about 
such things as self-regulation and the shaping effects on lawyers' behavior 
of "good" inherent values and principles.33 The system is such an obvious 
sham that it is best described as "unethical" in the sense that it has not ever 
actually worked as a serious deterrent of corrupt professional behavior, and 
it is getting worse rather than better. The recommendation is that the bur-
33. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct sets out the claim to self-
regulation in three paragraphs of its Preamble. If the facts demonstrate that lawyers and 
judges are not doing what the rhetoric and assumptions claim they must do in order to be 
legitimate regulators, then the clear conclusion is that they cannot be trusted with the respon-
sibility and a different system should be created. The provisions on which the existing sys-
tem rests are: 
[10] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also 
have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this 
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes 
of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that 
ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts. 
[II] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, 
the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps 
maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An in-
dependent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under 
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose 
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. 
[12] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibili-
ties of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regu-
lations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or 
self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their ob-
servance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the inde-
pendence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2011) (emphasis added). 
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geoning "cottage industry" involving legal ethics as designed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, adopted in various forms by state supreme courts and 
taught as a mandated subject by law schools, should be rejected and aban-
doned. In its place should be a civil liability system in which wronged cli-
ents can hold their lawyers to account based on a clear set of rules, audits, 
cost, and outcome estimates. It should also allow for statutory damages in 
situations where clear wrongs have occurred, but damages are relatively 
small or speculative. 
Instead of continuing to tinker on the margins with the pretense of try-
ing to improve a system that has consistently been demonstrated not to work 
effectively, there should be a statutory system designed to regulate the de-
livery of legal services to consumers.34 This consumer-oriented system 
would be aimed at setting effective standards for legal services, including 
honest pricing, estimates, record keeping, audits, warranties, negligence, 
license removal, and suspension for major violations and so forth. It should 
contain clear damage provisions, including devices such as minimum penal-
ties if breach of duty is established and treble damages for major violations. 
The reasons for these recommendations are varied. One of the most 
damning is that the existing system comprised of the ethics rules and judi-
cial oversight of lawyers in disputed cases is not only ineffective, but if we 
are honest, is of a character where it is designed to fail in any self-interested 
and competitive context in which the actors are empowered as the arbiters 
of the quality of their own conduct. Nor is the problem simply one of ques-
tionable enforcement of the formal rules of legal ethics through bar associa-
tions and grievance committees overseen by state courts. The doctrines of 
the existing lawyer malpractice system make it an ineffective means for 
holding lawyers to account other than in the most rare instances where well-
funded clients can afford to pursue their former lawyers for compensation. 
The challenge for reform is that the systems by which lawyers are 
purportedly regulated are not simply imperfect. They are unworkable. The 
system is a sham and dishonest gimmick that offers the pretense of profes-
34. James C. Turner & Suzanne M. Mishkin, Attorney Discipline: System Must 
Weed Out Unethical Lawyers Who Damage Profession's Reputation, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 16, 
2002, at 6. It states: "In 1970, a blue ribbon panel led by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom 
Clark conducted a groundbreaking review of the attorney discipline system, and found a 
'scandalous situation' that required 'the immediate attention of the profession."' ld. Given 
the great expansion in the number of lawyers competing for their slice of the "pie," heavy 
debt loads, and loss of core values that might have at least mitigated the decline in profes-
sionalism, the situation has actually worsened since Justice Clark's committee issued this 
warning. The remedy does not lie in any of the traditional approaches in which lawyers and 
courts are in charge of the disciplinary system. A new approach is required and no variation 
of "business as usual" will work. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EvALUATION OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY 
ENFORCEMENT ( 1970), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com= 
SC 133000&new ("The Clark Report"). 
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sional regulation with only the slightest substance. It aims to project the 
image of self-regulation by lawyers and judges when in fact it may well 
have the opposite effect given the widespread awareness by lawyers that it 
has little to do with what they do in their practices. Not only is the system of 
ethics largely tangential to what lawyers do, it is controlled and ruled over 
by the very people it purports to regulate-a "fox-in-the-henhouse" formula 
that guarantees a lowest common denominator orientation since the judicial 
and lawyer authorities are in essence regulating themselves. 
Legal ethicist Thomas Shaffer offers a useful perspective, quoting 
G.K. Chesterton: "The horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, 
[including] ... all judges, ... is not that they are wicked (some ofthem are 
good), not that they are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent), it is 
simply that they have got used to it."35 If "familiarity breeds contempt," 
lawyers who are responsible for holding themselves and other lawyers to a 
high standard have contempt for the system according to which they are 
supposed to operate in providing services to their clients. A result is that 
they continually overlook and rationalize unprofessional behavior both by 
others and themselves. 
Another cause of the ineffective system that allows lawyers to be 
largely unaccountable for the quality of representation rendered to clients is 
that the clients who feel they have been betrayed by their lawyers have to 
obtain other legal counsel, and that is itself a problem. Legal malpractice 
cases are often complicated and other lawyers generally do not want to han-
dle a case against another member of the lawyer "guild." It is seldom that 
lawyers to whom wronged clients go to pursue redress against a former 
lawyer are willing to take cases on a contingency fee basis. This is due to 
the amount of damages in controversy, the problems with proof in some 
disputes, and the fact that it is obvious that the opponent is a lawyer and will 
be able to assume some of the costs by their own work in contrast to ordi-
nary opponents who need to pay lawyer fees. 
When it comes to legal malpractice actions, the existing legal and eq-
uitable remedies that are available in theory apply almost exclusively to 
very well-financed clients and large corporations who can pay for the cost 
of the remedy to which they are entitled. For ordinary clients, even reasona-
bly well-off upper middle class clients, the costs of pursuing remedies are 
35. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERTS. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND 
PEOPLE I 0 (1977). Shaffer continues: 
People in institutions have a way of acting, an official tendency to tum other peoc 
pie into commodities, and to excuse themselves with grand, official phrases such as 
health, justice, equality, due process, privacy, democracy, and the rule of law. But 
behind the phrases are hidden patterns of behavior that show, when brought into 
the light, that people in institutions usually do not have values strong enough for 
community life. 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 109 (1987). 
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prohibitive. It is often the case that the wronged clients have exhausted their 
resources with the first lawyer and can't afford to pay another lawyer either 
at all or without exacerbating an already difficult situation by sinking deeper 
into debt. 
It is useful to gain an understanding that a legal malpractice case is 
more complex, and therefore expensive, than many other forms of litigation. 
Legal malpractice involves what is referred to as a "suit within a suit" in 
that the merit of the underlying case (the one the first lawyer is alleged to 
have messed up) is a critical element of the malpractice claim. This obvi-
ously raises the bar and the costs of the litigation and, along with the fact 
that it clearly will involve another lawyer as an opponent capable of fighting 
aggressively with delaying tactics and motions, adds another layer of ex-
pense and complexity.36 
The result is that there are remedies on paper that are unworkable for 
virtually all clients failed by their lawyers. Consequently, incompetent, ne-
glectful, and venal lawyers get a free ride for unprofessional behavior. This 
unfairly costs their unfortunate clients either unnecessary legal fees and 
expenses or inappropriate settlements or other recoveries or payments, and 
it is a form of corruption.37 
36. For a description of the legal basics of a malpractice claim against a lawyer see 
John P. Blumberg, Pitfalls of the Legal Malpractice Lawsuit, BLUMBERG LAW OFFICES, 
http://www.blumberglaw.com/article-pitfalls.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). Blumberg 
writes: 
!d. 
A legal malpractice case is viable only if there is underlying causation. That is 
to say, "no harm-no foul." The inquiry begins with the former case, also known 
as the "underlying" case. For example, in Harris v. Smith (1984) 157 Cai.App.3d 
I 00, the previous attorney had not filed the complaint before the expiration of the 
one-year statute of limitations. However, the subsequent legal malpractice case re-
sulted in a non-suit because the plaintiff was unable to prove that the underlying 
action was meritorious. Similarly, in Sukoff v. Lemkin (1988) 202 Cai.App.3d 
740, the previous attorney did not investigate the assets of his client's husband in a 
dissolution of marriage case, but the plaintiff lost her legal malpractice case be-
cause she did not prove that the attorney's failure to investigate the assets would 
have actually led to a higher award. 
These legal malpractice cases were unsuccessful because the plaintiffs could 
not prove that their underlying cases had merit or that the result would have been 
different. It is not enough that the prior lawyer was negligent; his or her error must 
have caused damage. There are, in reality, two cases which must be proven in legal 
malpractice litigation. After it is proven that the prior lawyer was negligent, the 
plaintiff must essentially try (or re-try) the underlying case. This is called "the 
case-within-the-case." The evaluation of the underlying case must be the starting 
point of the lawyer considering whether to accept a legal malpractice case. 
37. Robert Klitgaard writes: 
[C]orruption may be represented as ... a formula: C = M + D - A. Corruption 
equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. Whether the activity is pub-
lic, private, or nonprofit, ... one will tend to find corruption when an organization 
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One area that should be mentioned, however, relates to the conduct of 
lawyers involved in litigation and the already existing inherent powers of 
judges to regulate the attorneys' behavior. Judges, for example, already 
have extensive inherent power to sanction lawyers for their misconduct, 
negligence, or sloth. Although judges have the authority to shape and sanc-
tion lawyers, it is rare that they exercise that power.38 The fact that few 
sanctions are imposed by judges in the face of frequent abuses or delays 
demonstrates the failure of the judge-controlled system in which the partici-
pants are in essence judging themselves as members of the professional 
guild as much as anything. Even here there are alternative regulatory strate-
gies that are more capable of shaping the behavior of lawyers. 
Certainly this reluctance is understandable. Part of the problem goes to 
the complexity, intrusiveness, and resource intensivity of what judges would 
have to do in order to provide effective oversight. It would also require in-
trusion into what is supposed to be a secret process and create an expensive 
bureaucracy that would take on a life of its own. While convinced the exist-
ing system too often fails clients, we need to think carefully about how best 
to design and implement a better way of regulating lawyers. Part of the dif-
ficulty is caused by the allocation of who bears the burden of going forward 
with investigations and sanctions. 
In theory, lawyers are required to report unprofessional and unethical 
behavior by other lawyers. This is a central element of a self-regulating pro-
fession. But lawyers rarely report delinquent behavior, and if they do it is 
generally to gain a tactical advantage rather than concern for improving the 
legal profession. There is very little chance that this culture of law practice 
will change unless legal actions on behalf of allegedly wronged clients are 
made more profitable for a specialized niche of lawyers who gain fmancial-
ly by suing or seeking pre-litigation settlements from other lawyers who 
allegedly rendered substandard service. The disciplinary process will not do 
this because it reacts to complaints rather than seeks them out. If clients 
don't file grievances the disciplinary system will not take action. 
The failure of judges to use their power to improve the quality of the 
lawyers who appear before them has several less admirable causes. These 
or person has monopoly power over a good or service, has the discretion to decide 
who will receive it and how much that person will get, and is not accountable. 
Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, 35 FIN. & DEY., at 3, 4 
(1998); see also ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988). It is hard to deny 
that the "fit" between the legal profession's terms of operation and Klitgaard's categories is 
uncomfortably tight. Lawyers and judges possess a monopoly over legal services and the 
institutions of law. They possess the discretion to assess the quality of services and to deter-
mine when lawyers and judges are held accountable for their behavior. 
38. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 
1389, 1461-78 (1992), for the proposition that courts are hesitant to deal with lawyers' con-
duct outside litigation. 
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include not wanting to offend the people who contribute to their campaign 
funds. They involve desiring to not anger lawyers who will be providing 
responses for public indicators of support for the judicial candidate.39 The 
probability that the judge behaved the same way prior to elevation to the 
bench must be considered along with the "understanding" that "lawyers will 
be lawyers." 
It is also the fact that confrontation with lawyers is unpleasant, and 
fact-finding is time-consuming and complex. Few people eagerly seek out 
conflict they can avoid. There is an expectation that the lawyers are sup-
posed to work out their disagreements, although this is increasingly unlikely 
without strong judicial intervention. But some of the problem with judges 
can be attributed to the fact that a percentage of the bench is just plain lazy 
and doesn't want to be bothered.40 The bottom line is that in cases before 
them, while judges actually possess extensive power of the kind required to 
regulate lawyers they just don't do it. How you convince judges to use their 
inherent powers is beyond me, but it begins with the nature of the particular 
judge. Unfortunately we seem to be putting a fair number of less-than-
qualified people on the bench. 
B. The "Invisibility" of What Lawyers Do 
In addition to lawyers' self-interest in not having a system of real ac-
countability, one of the reasons there is an almost total lack of effective 
regulation is that most of what lawyers do is invisible-to their clients, to 
opposing lawyers, and to judges. When the lawyer's behavior is concealed 
and there are no external monitors, the likelihood of initial detection of un-
professional behavior or of being held accountable and suffering sanctions 
in any but the most dramatic situations is virtually nil.41 In such a context, if 
a system is one in which there are no sufficient external mechanisms to in-
hibit unprincipled behavior and create incentives for principled conduct, 
there must be a powerful and relevant internal code operating within the 
individual. Those moral codes have mostly disappeared both because our 
culture has become increasingly unprincipled and corrupt and because law-
yers employed by law firms are controlled by the profit-seeking and surviv-
al strategies of those entities.42 
39. On these issues see David Bamhizer, "On The Make": Campaign Funding and 
the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (2001). 
40. !d. 
41. Klitgaard, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION, supra note 37, at 52-55. 
42. Walter Lippmann remarks that men have become dissolved into "'an anonymous 
mass' because they are 'without an authentic world, without provenance or roots,"' without a 
belief system and faith by which to Jive. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 87 
(1956) (quoting KARL JASPERS, THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY 127-28 (Michael Bullock 
trans., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1953) (1949)). 
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The task invisibility of much of law practice means that clients are at 
the mercy of their lawyers concerning claims to activities made by the same 
lawyers who keep the records. Nor are there means available to judge the 
quality of what has occurred in critical areas of representation such as coun-
seling, research, investigation, case analysis and evaluation, strategy, and 
negotiation. Virtually all of what lawyers do takes place behind the closed 
doors of their offices and through legal processes where the lawyers are the 
only ones who know what has actually been done versus what is claimed. 
This is made even easier by the fact that lawyers' opponents are behaving 
according to the same self-interested norms. The "foxes" prance around 
their own client territory and may "snarl" at each other to keep up the show 
but always operate according to the sacred commandment, "There but for 
the grace of God go I," and are cowed by the knowledge that accusations of 
a lack of professionalism and loyalty to clients is a two-edged sword. 
C. "Survival" Economics and an "Infestation" of Lawyers 
The increased numbers of lawyers admitted to the legal profession 
over the past few decades who are pursuing a finite pot of client fees caused 
one Ohio judge to describe lawyers as "fleas." In sentencing an attorney for 
dipping into client funds, the judge described the problem as one where 
there was not enough legal work to go around but that law schools kept 
churning out lawyers regardless of the legal profession's or society's need 
or demand.43 In equating lawyers with "fleas" the judge said the lawyer he 
was sentencing was obviously desperate for money and that: "'It's difficult 
to earn a living."'44 He concluded: "'I'm not excusing you. I'm blaming the 
entire legal profession. "'45 
43. The intense competition for clients can lead to a state of professional "burnout." 
Susan Davis tells us of the consequences ofbumout of the kind many lawyers are experienc-
ing. A state of anxiety, fatigue, and depression makes the individual lawyer subject to nega-
tive values and behaviors. Susan Davis, Burnout, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 48; see also 
MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 4 
(1994) (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: THE EMERGING 
CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVES-ITS IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND 
CLIENT SERVICES (1991 )); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lawyer Impairment: More Common Than 
You Might Think, Denver Survey Suggests, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 32. A 1989 survey of 
thirty-four managing partners of Denver-based law firms suggests that the problem oflawyer 
impairment--one that firms of all sizes are slow to acknowledge and even slower at doing 
something about-is far from unusual. "The causes of impairment were most often alcohol-
ism and marital problems, and the areas of performance most often affected were billable 
hours (seventy-nine percent), the ability to withstand pressure (seventy-nine percent) and the 
quality of work (seventy-five percent)." Goldberg, supra, at 32. 
44. Dan Hom, Judge Decries Lawyers as "Fleas," CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 13, 
2000, at 3B. 
45. !d.; see generally Most Law Graduates Dissappointed [sic]: Few Jobs, Low 
Salaries, High Stress, L. STUDENT (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.lawstudent.tv/2007/II/23/ 
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The problem with the "business" of private law practice is that few 
lawyers find a queue of eager clients lining up outside the office door beg-
ging for the lawyer's services. The private practice of law on all levels, but 
particularly on the tier of solo and small firm practice, involves a constant 
hustle to identify and recruit clients willing and able to pay your fees. In the 
United States there are many lawyers and fewer potential clients willing to 
pay the costs of legal representation. Nor do many potential clients know 
anything about the lawyers they retain regarding quality because there is no 
way other than by talking to people who may have used that person's ser-
vices and are satisfied with the results to even begin to obtain a sense of 
ability and competence. 
The explosive growth in the competing population of lawyers in pri-
vate practice has produced a "survival of the fittest" reality in which clients 
receive short shrift. From the standpoint of failure to protect client interests 
through efficient and dedicated service, the lawyer's survival often means 
having to milk maximum fees out of a case and spreading oneself too thin. 
A result is that cases are poorly understood, badly investigated and re-
searched, and inappropriately evaluated as to realistic outcome potential. A 
consequence is that disputes are handled mainly with threats and bluster 
rather than real professionalism. 
The increasingly harsh competitive context faced by lawyers in private 
practice is best understood by looking at the gross population of lawyers 
that have flooded into the profession over the past twenty years or so. There 
are more than 1.1 million lawyers licensed to practice in the US. 46 This in-
cludes 400,000 who have entered the profession just in the past ten years, 
representing nearly forty percent of the total number of lawyers engaged in 
private practice.47 Fifty percent of the lawyers in private practice are in solo 
most-law-graduates-dissappointed-few-jobs-low-salaries-high-stress/ ("There seems to be a 
growing problem among law school graduates and new attorneys. They can't find law jobs, 
the jobs they find don't pay enough to repay law school loans, and the jobs require unhealthy 
amounts of hours doing the type of work that many lawyers find unsatisfYing, or worse. The 
number of law school graduates continues to increase must [sic] faster than the number of 
law jobs available. The supply of law graduates is high, but the demand has not kept pace. As 
a result, law school graduates who did not graduate in the top I 0% of a Tier I law school are 
having great difficulty getting a job in law that pays enough to pay off their law school loans. 
Further, even those law graduates who find jobs are often unhappy with the practice of law 
and the high number of hours they must spend at the firm."). 
46. AM. BAR Ass'N MARKET RESEARCH DEP'T, ABA LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, 
(2009), available at http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/Lawyer _Demo 
graphics.pdf [hereinafter LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS]; see United States Population Growth, 
CENSUSSCOPE, http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_popl.htrnl (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). 
The data place the 1980 population at 226,545,805, the 1990 population at 248,709,873, and 
the 2000 population at 281,421,906. The 1970 population was 203,302,031./d 
47. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47 (stating that 48% of U.S. lawyers were 
in solo practice in 2000 and another 15% in 2-5 lawyer firms, resulting in 63% in those forms 
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situations with another fifteen percent in very small law firms with 2-5 law-
yers.48 The Chicago II study of solo practitioners concluded that in constant 
dollars the annual earnings had declined in real value over a twenty-year 
period from $99,000 to $55,000.49 
In the twenty-year period between 1980 and 2000, there was an almost 
100 percent increase in the number of solo practitioners (an additional 
246,257 added to 1980's 265,580) and another 40,000 lawyers in the 2-5 
lawyer firms. 50 Given the fact that 400,000 new graduates have entered the 
legal profession since 2000 and that the number of stable well-paying law 
jobs with law firms has been under great pressure, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the majority of the more recent graduates have gone into solo 
practices. 51 Unfortunately, given the nature of American legal education that 
pays no attention to the dynamics and needs of the tiers of law practice rep-
resented by solo practitioners and small firms, those graduates are quite ill-
of law practice); see also CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL 
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 (2004) [hereinafter LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
2000]; CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1995 (1999); BARBRA A. CURRAN, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER 
STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN the 1980's 
(1985); G.M. Filisko, Turn-around: Solos Seek Advice to Survive a Struggling Economy, 96 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 2010, at 51, 51-55; LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47. These numbers 
are based on the total number of lawyers in 1980 versus 2000 multiplied by the percentage of 
lawyers in solo practice 49% in 1980 and 48% in 2000, and by 22% in 2-5 person firms in 
1980 and 15% in those "micro-firms" in 2000. !d. The differences do not stem from the 
percentages themselves but from the growth in the absolute number oflawyers. For example, 
see Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition, 20 LAW 
& Soc'y REv. 19-54 (1986), who places the U.S. lawyer population at 542,000 at the begin-
ning of 1980. See also LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000, supra, which reports 1,066,328 lawyers in 
2000. Applying the percentages in each practice format (2-5 lawyer firms and solo practice) 
results in 119,240 lawyers in the 2-5 person firms in 1980 versus 159,949 in 2000, and 
265,580 solo practitioners in 1980 versus 511,837 in 2000. 
48. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47. 
49. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR 163, tbl. 7.1 (2005) (comparing mean and median lawyer incomes over the stated peri-
od). 
50. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 47. 
51. See, e.g., NAT'L AsS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, PERSPECTIVES ON FALL 2009 LAW 
STUDENT RECRUITING 1 (2010), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Perspectiveson 
Fal1Rec09.pdf("As the U.S. and global economies were battered by 'the Great Recession' in 
the third quarter of 2009, recruiting volumes by U.S. legal employers on the campuses of 
U.S. law schools nose-dived. In fact, the data provided by NALP members about fall 2009 
recruiting reveal that most of the trends and patterns that the industry had come to rely upon 
were upended, dramatically so in some cases. All of the markers that measure the strength of 
the legal employment market for new lawyers, such as law firm recruiting levels for summer 
programs and summer program outcomes, fell in 2009, continuing and accelerating the gen-
eral downward trend in recruiting volumes that was measured in 2008."); Karen Sloan, 
Summer Associate Offers Hit 17-Year Low, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.law.com 
/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202 445314748. 
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prepared for what they face.52 Some form relationships with others unfortu-
nate enough to be similarly situated to spread operating costs, or become 
vulnerable junior associates in small firms that are themselves operating on 
the margin. 
The competitive pressures result in several kinds of malfeasance, in-
cluding overbilling and billing for work not done by the lawyer. Lisa Ler-
man analyzed law firm practices involving hourly fees and found that: 
Survey data ... suggests that a majority of lawyers who bill by the hour at least 
occasionally inflate their hours, and that a smaller percentage of them anonymous-
ly admit to larger-scale inflation of hours or fabrication of time records. Most law-
yers report that other lawyers engage in billing fraud more often than they them-
selves do. 53 
In this same vein, Ralph Nader and Wesley Smith relate the use of the 
"BUTS Principle" for large law firms. The BUTS acronym stands for "Bill 
Until They Squawk."54 Such action is obviously unprincipled and unethical. 
It also is civil fraud and even criminal theft that is considerably more wide-
spread in the legal profession. 
The system has become one where many lawyers struggle to exist on 
the fringes of the legal profession and have no realistic expectation of being 
able to practice law as they had been led to believe was possible. The high 
degree of professional skill and job satisfaction they anticipate, as well as a 
reasonable income of the kind associated with professional status and the 
expenditure of $100,000 or more they invested for law school are simply 
out of reach. 55 This produces a situation in which lawyers face almost in-
surmountable obstacles to professionalism both in terms of ethics and the 
quality of professional performance. Their law practices are undercapital-
ized, they lack the skills and knowledge required for real professionalism, 
have little or no access to mentoring relationships with more senior practi-
52. The Layoff List: Employment Shifts at The Am Law 200, Global 100, and other 
Firms of Note, AM. L., May 19, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal!PubArticleTAL. 
jsp?id=1202425647706; see Nate Raymond, Job Losses in Legal Sector Continue, AMLAW 
DAILY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/job-losses-in-
legal-sector-continue.html. 
53. Lerman, supra note 30, at 228. 
54. NADER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 233. 
55. See Law School Educational Debt Has a Manageable Solution, ABA DIV. FOR 
MEDIA RELATIONS & COMM'N SERV., http://www.abanow.org/2009/ll/law-school-
educational-debt-has-a-manageable-solution/ (last visited Jan. 17, 20 II) ("Every year, law 
students embark on a three-year course of study that will prepare them for a rewarding pro-
fession, but will also likely leave many of them with more than $80,000 of debt. It is increas-
ingly common for law graduates to owe $100,000 or $150,000 and even more.") A recent 
report concluded that a significant number of law students were graduating with at least 
$120,000 in educational debt. See Paul L. Caron, 46'Yo-60% of Law School Class of 2013 
Will Graduate with $120k Debt, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 15, 2009), http://taxprof.typepad. 
com/taxprof_ blog/20 10/0 I /4660-of-law-.html. 
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tioners, scrabble for clients in a cut-throat world of practice, and are con-
stantly at risk from an ethical perspective due to inadequate fees and clients. 
As indicated in the comments concerning the "task invisibility" of law 
practice, lawyers can get away with such abuses because they operate in 
what can be described as a non-transparent system in which the bulk of 
what they do is obscured. In a non-transparent system where clients have 
little knowledge of what their lawyers are actually doing and almost no abil-
ity to evaluate the quality of representation, typical abuses of clients include 
not only billing unworked hours, but multiplying the billable hour through 
the use of minimum time segments. This is achieved by billing twenty per-
cent of an hour (using twelve minute billing increments as a minimum) even 
if it is represented only by attempting a phone call and leaving a message on 
voicemail. The lawyer may spend three or four minutes talking with a client 
or another lawyer on a case but bill .20 hours for the interaction. 
Done strategically, ten such contacts in a single "real" hour covering 
sixty minutes could be transformed into 2.0 billable hours (10 x .20 mini-
mum billing increments). Methods also include senior partners billing at 
their higher rates for the work of junior personnel, firms billing lawyer rates 
for paralegals and secretaries, advising clients not to accept settlements that 
are reasonable so the firm can keep billing, taking unnecessary depositions, 
and failing to provide detailed bills so the clients can't accurately monitor 
what has been done.56 All represent techniques through which bad lawyers 
cheat clients. 57 
An added problem is that even though law firms tell clients they are 
saving them money by assigning associates who bill fees at lesser rates to 
do the work, in many instances the associates lack sufficient knowledge and 
experience about the specific type of situation. The result is that the client 
ends up paying for the associate's development of "intellectual capital" in 
the area involved in the dispute. This can mean that clients are effectively 
paying $400 or $500 per hour in terms of the associate's actual efficiency 
because of the "getting up to speed" aspect of the situation and the need for 
a senior attorney to review the associate's work. 
The clients are in effect also paying for the lawyer's opportunity to 
develop intellectual capital and experience in an area of which they were 
unfamiliar, a situation where it would seem fair that the lawyer or firm "eat" 
some of the developmental expenses involved in bringing the associate or 
56. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 20. 
57. See Lerman, supra note 30; Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition 
to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
879 (2002). Hourly billing has been described as "a devilish creature that rewards inefficien-
cy and penalizes productivity." Kenneth Roberts, The Hourly Fee System is a "Devilish 
Creature," in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING 
METHODS 35 (Richard C. Reeded., 1989). 
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otherwise inexperienced lawyer up to a reasonable level of knowledge to be 
of actual use to the client. Clients should not have to pay for lawyers' on-
the-job training time. Even here the reality can be worse because associates . 
are under pressure to maximize billable hours and can be doing needless or 
redundant work under the rubric of paying the greatest attention to the cli-
ent's needs. Nor is there any guarantee that the associate understands the 
procedures and strategic context of the case sufficiently to make intelligent 
decisions about priorities and focus. 
Another typical condition is that if the client can pay a relatively lim-
ited fee, a lawyer often takes actions that consume that fee quickly to the 
surprise of the client. Then the case is resolved at a relatively low level of 
possible outcomes because the client is unable to pay the costs of continuing 
the case. The case may lie dormant with no effort going into it because the 
lawyer is insisting on payment of additional accrued fees. Rather than care-
fully understanding the resource limits and conserving them strategically, 
the situation is approached at the beginning as if there were no such limits. 
This results in a kind of "grinding" of a client's limited assets. All available 
funds are extracted from accounts intended for other needs, credit cards are 
"maxed," second mortgages are taken out, or lines of credit drawn down to 
pay legal costs and fees that have ballooned far beyond original expecta-
tions that were either never discussed with the client, soft-pedaled, or given 
"low-ball" estimates. 
As discussed in several of the Examples in Part I, some lawyers 
"chum" cases to maximize fees by doing unnecessary work or overbilling in 
ways that exhaust the client's ability to pay relatively early in the process of 
representation. This may be deliberate, in which case it borders on fraud, or 
it may be that the lawyer feels that he or she is providing the highest possi-
ble quality of service by "covering all bases." It also has the effect of hook-
ing the client into the process due to the large expenditures that have been 
made so that they feel compelled to max out credit cards or deplete savings 
or take out second mortgages because they become convinced it is the only 
way to protect the significant investment that has already been made. 
In that sense the behavior of many lawyers is a sort of low-level Ponzi 
scheme in which the clients whose assets are being drained are the hopeless 
and unwitting victims who keep investing because, like the bankrupted 
Jarndyce heirs-apparent, they hope that there is a potential return that will 
be to their benefit or at least make them whole. Once a client has been 
drawn into the "fee web" far enough, the "sunk capital" produces a psy-
chology of hope and resignation such that the client is caught in the web of 
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poor legal service but continues to hope for a positive outcome. 58 Seldom 
does this work out. 
If another fee arrangement such as a contingency fee is involved, the 
ultimate outcome and degree of work done by the lawyer relates to how 
many other cases the lawyer is involved in, the potential for a substantial 
outcome relative to other cases and the amount of work involved, and other 
demands on the lawyer's time.59 Even in the contingency situation where 
fees do not seem to be the main issue in terms of initial fee charge to the 
client, the need to expend scarce client funds on filing costs, expensive dep-
ositions, and expert witnesses also strains the ability of clients to sustain the 
momentum in a dispute in which the client is required to cover litigation 
expenses. In other contingency fee situations where the lawyer is advancing 
the costs and deferring the receipt of fees anticipated from completion of the 
dispute, the increasing out-of-pocket expenditures by the lawyer can also 
work against the contingent fee client due to financial outlays the lawyer 
desires or needs to recoup from a possible settlement. Lawyers, like other 
businesses, have cash flow requirements for employee expenses, rent, utili-
ties, taxes, and numerous other necessities that must be dealt with. A result 
can be that the lawyer in need of money pushes for a settlement that is in his 
interests rather than the client's.60 
58. On this quite important issue, see BMA Editorial Team A, Making the Psychol-
ogy of Sunk Costs Work for You, http:/leconomics.bestmanagementarticles.com/a-36696-
making-the-psychology-of-sunk-costs-work-for-you.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
When making a decision, one of the worst errors is that of sunk costs; contin-
ually investing time, energy, and money into a project or course of action that is 
not meeting its performance expectations or goals. Sunk cost errors are rooted in 
the human psychological need to persevere and succeed regardless of insurmount-
able obstacles. This need is emotionally compounded as more and more resources 
are invested into attaining an outcome that is logically implausible. 
From a purely economic perspective, sunk costs refer to costs that have "al-
ready been committed and cannot be recovered." These costs should be ignored 
when making future decisions because there is no course of action that would be 
able to recover these resources, especially the time that has already been lost. Alt-
hough this concept is easy to understand, people do not always make decisions ra-
tionally. Instead many allow feelings of regret to cloud their better judgment, and 
continue on a failing path instead of admitting defeat, letting go, and avoiding fu-
ture losses. 
Id. (citations omitted). I argue from experience that this psychology has an enormous influ-
ence on clients who are dissatisfied with their lawyers but cannot let go because they hope 
against hope that things will tum out well in the end. But in many instances they have al-
ready exhausted their resources and are caught in the mystery, ambiguity, and uncertainty of 
the legal system which they simply do not understand. 
59. On the problems with contingency fees, see, for example, Lester Brickman and 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Critics of the Absolute 
Ban, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. ll (1995), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=1002943. 
60. See generally the discussion of billing pressures in Lerman, supra note 30, at 
225-27. 
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These problems are exacerbated because in areas where disputes are 
involved as opposed to transactional and counseling matters, the law busi-
ness-driven behaviors of opposing lawyers play a significant part in deter-
mining the volume of costs and fees. Even if one lawyer is acting ethically 
on behalf of his client, if the other lawyer has not properly prepared and 
evaluated his client's case due to other business demands, laziness or has 
given in to the desire to maximize fees, there is very little that can be done 
to change the situation. Sorry about the cliche, but for principled outcomes 
to occur it "takes two to tango," and if one lawyer isn't "dancing" because 
that lawyer is self-dealing, there is not a great deal that can be done about it 
under current rules. 
PART III: FACTORS lNVOL VED IN PERFORMING A CASE EVALUATION 
Behaviors such as those discussed in Part I's Examples are clearly 
ones that betray one's client and call for accountability through a system of 
low-cost and accessible civil liability. Whether we are speaking of a corrupt 
lawyer who is cheating his client, an incompetent or negligent lawyer, or a 
lawyer overwhelmed by the competitive demands of law practice, most cli-
ents are unsophisticated consumers of legal services who lack the back-
ground or ability to understand what is or is not being done on their behalf. 
As a general rule unsophisticated clients with little or no prior contact with 
law and lawyers lack the ability to see what is or is not being done on their 
behalf. They are at the mercy of their lawyers and are easily manipulated 
and kept in the dark about what is being done. Nor do they have the ability 
to judge the quality of the services they receive. 
This state of ignorance is due to the "mystery" of the law and its pro-
cesses and to the lack of task transparency in the relationship. Research, 
telephone calls and investigation, strategic planning, and contacts with op-
ponents and courts are activities that the clients generally do not see, assum-
ing they are occurring at all. Clients consequently have to take the word of 
their lawyers about the necessity, quality, and fact of the activities. This 
includes not only taking the lawyer's word that tasks were actually done, 
but that they needed to be done, that they were done at a substantial level of 
quality, and that the time and effort claimed by the lawyer was not only 
accurate but necessary. Clients are therefore at their lawyer's mercy, and too 
many lawyers do not deserve their clients' trust. 
For this part of the analysis the only principle is that of providing the 
client with the best outcome that can be reasonably achieved through what-
ever mode of dispute resolution provides the most effective approach based 
on the probabilities involved in the dispute or transaction. This might be 
something as simple as not joining in or exacerbating a dispute because the 
financial, time, energy, and emotional costs are such that even a "success-
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ful" outcome is a loss or "Pyrrhic Victory" that costs more than it is worth 
when judged according to parameters critical to the client. 
Lawyers owe clients pragmatic and detailed evaluations about what 
approaches are possible and preferable. This includes the outcome probabil-
ities for each path of action, the strengths and weaknesses of each side of 
the dispute, the timing and conditions of how the interactions are likely to 
play out, and the costs of the dispute depending on how the parties proceed. 
This also requires that the lawyer assist the client in identifying clear, prag-
matic, and realistic goals for the representation. The problem is that while 
objective evaluative counseling is one of the most difficult aspects of a law-
yer's provision of quality professional services to a client, for various rea-
sons it is an area in which lawyers often fail their clients. 
Learning how to perform early and effective strategic analyses is at 
the heart of the responsibility lawyers owe clients even though such anal-
yses sometimes works against the self-interest of lawyers if they mainly 
want to "milk" a case in order to extract substantial monetary returns from 
clients without having to spend a great deal of time on the matter. Although 
the specific method and source of the evaluative analysis in which lawyers 
should engage varies depending on the type and complexity of the case-
including whether litigation or transactional issues are involved, the amount 
in controversy, available resources, and client-type-the core assumption is 
that too many clients are spending too much on cases and still not receiving 
the kinds of resolutions to which they may be entitled. 
As discussed in relation to the commodification of clients, at the heart 
of the dilemma is that their lawyers have converted the dispute or transac-
tion (the client) into a financial asset from which they are seeking to extract 
maximum benefit for themselves or their firm rather than for the clients. In 
such a situation lawyers are not champions or effective advocates concen-
trating on protecting their clients' interests, but business actors focused on 
increasing their own return on the "asset" represented by the client's dispute 
or transactional need. 
In an effort to introduce the idea of early comprehensive case evalua-
tion, I have set out below some of what I consider essential elements of effi-
cient strategic analysis a lawyer might go through in handling a client's 
matter and explaining key aspects. Some key principles of evaluation are 
discussed here in an effort to show what factors come into play in transac-
tions and disputes of the kind that lawyers should develop in order to ensure 
that their clients better understand recommended courses of action and like-
ly outcomes and costs. The idea is that lawyers are responsible for doing 
certain things when handling a dispute or transaction for their clients as a 
matter of contract, warranty, fiduciary duty, and agency law. 
One reason lawyers get away with providing deficient representation, 
as indicated previously, is that much of what lawyers do, should do, or pur-
port to have done for their clients is invisible, taking place, if at all, behind 
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closed doors. Another reason is that the costs of law practice and the earn-
ings expectations and needs of lawyers have escalated to the point that 
many lawyers in private practice are leading "helter-skelter" existences just 
to make ends meet. Even for the best of lawyers operating on the solo and 
micro-firm scale of private practice, the undertaking is tough unless they are 
fortunate enough to have a substantial and dependable source of income 
from clients such as local government or an insurance company that can 
supply a steady and predictable flow of income. 
Without that kind of sustainable and regular earnings base, many law-
yers are engaged in a speculative business model whose core involves 
scrounging for clients. The result of this speculative and uncertain model of 
private law practice is that there is very little time to devote to the planning, 
preparation, and implementation of a single client's dispute or transaction. 
This means that the "ideal" approach to client representation involving what 
should be done in the best-case scenario of representation is an impossibly 
optimistic dream for many lawyers. It also means that it is absolutely vital 
that a lawyer develop the skills of early case assessment so that intelligent 
and effective strategies can be identified at a point where honest and accu-
rate advice can be provided to the client. 
The answer is not found in the current structure and content of law 
school curricula. Law schools fail to deal with some of the most critical 
aspects of client representation in which most lawyers in private practice 
find themselves after graduation. One problem is that while clinical legal 
education does offer one way to provide a limited number of students with a 
controlled experience that introduces them to important aspects of law prac-
tice, the typical clinical experience has little to do with the demands and 
strategies of private law practice in which many of the most serious prob-
lems of client betrayal exist. Clinical education programs have mainly been 
designed as law reform and poverty law undertakings for admirable reasons. 
It has also been the case that private lawyers did not want law school subsi-
dized "house" law firms siphoning paying clients from the private bar. 
Given the origins and nature of clinical programs, to the extent courses 
in clinical education involve students in actual client representation, most of 
the disputes and transactions involve clients without resources who are re-
ceiving the clinics' services free of charge. I am a strong supporter of clini-
cal education, but the fact is that its focus on public interest concerns, social 
justice, and impoverished clients does little to prepare law students for entry 
into the competitive world of private practice. This is even more important 
on the solo and micro-firm levels that so many new graduates are now en-
tering. 
Evaluation of the numerous variables involved in disputes and transac-
tions is complex and inherently judgmental. It is also fact-driven and influ-
enced by the personalities and capabilities of clients, opposing clients, and 
attorneys. In other words, just as "beauty" is in the eye of the beholder, law-
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yers will have quite different opinions about their clients' cases depending 
on the side they are representing. The gap between the competing evalua-
tions may be completely reasonable. Or, unfortunately, it may be due to the 
fact that one lawyer has figured out the probable outcome accurately but the 
other is unprepared, inexperienced, unskilled, or unable to estimate probable 
outcomes, risks, and values properly. In deciding whether to try or settle a 
dispute, it is unfortunately too often the case that lawyers have not paid 
enough attention to the dispute and the claims being made to make intelli-
gent evaluations of its worth, risks, and outcome probabilities. 
Reaching a settlement based on lawyers' mutually high quality as-
sessments of the best ways to proceed is very difficult when one or both 
sides have not done the hard work required. Ideally, the assessments should 
be done at an early enough point to allow the lawyer to develop realistic 
strategies that increase the probability of resolving the case when it should 
be resolved rather than wasting resources and time. Similarly, relatively 
early and realistic assessments of outcome probabilities can enable lawyers 
to identify situations where it is unlikely that a reasonable resolution can be 
achieved, whether due to legitimately different estimations of the likely 
outcome or "churning" and other forms of unprofessional behavior by the 
opposing lawyers. 
But too many lawyers fail to do the diligent work required to assess 
the risks, costs, and probabilities of achieving a particular desired outcome. 
This is because too often they are evaluating the worth of the case in rela-
tion to the benefits that can be gained for their practice. This calculation is 
done in relation to the scale of retainers and fees the lawyer can achieve or 
by balancing the return on the individual case against the time required to 
deal with other matters for which they are responsible. This is a fully ration-
al business judgment and an equally unethical professional choice. 
A. Evaluation Principle# 1: Identify Your Client's Reasonably Achievable 
Goals and Available Resources 
Winning is the ultimate purpose of legal representation. A lawyer's 
representation of the client should be goal-driven, and the primary object is 
to achieve a victory for the client, defined as the best and most pragmatic 
possible outcome that can realistically be achieved. The lawyer should 
begin the process of evaluation by asking what the outcome should be when 
it is finished. Another way of saying this is what would be a victory or a 
win in the specific interaction? In some instances winning is defined as 
avoiding losing or at least mitigating negative consequences. Being goal-
driven seems simple, but it is amazing how many people never focus clearly 
on realistic goals aimed at achieving what I refer to as pragmatic definitions 
of victory. 
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Without a realistic and pragmatic definition of goals and the terms of 
victory, other strategic considerations are largely irrelevant. The lawyer 
must therefore ask at the beginning of the strategic process: "What is it that 
we seek to achieve? What does our victory look like? Where do we want to 
be when this is done? What price will the process exact, and how much of 
that price are we willing to pay to achieve our ends?" This combines the 
ideas of victories in specific tactical situations of a kind that advance a cli-
ent's interests and victory in the totality of the dispute or transaction. This is 
neither as easy nor as obvious as it sounds. Defining the specific terms of 
victory not only for you, but your allies and adversaries is important. This is 
because deception, false impressions, and hiding behind masks and illusions 
are key elements of strategy. Both you and your opponents construct false 
images of your positions and desires in an effort to achieve desired goals. 
Understanding the terms of your victory and being aware of the most likely 
terms of your opponent's victory helps you to hold to your perspective 
against the illusions and the distorting pressures generated by the heat of 
conflict. Being anchored in this way gives you a secure place from which to 
perceive, evaluate, and choose paths of action. This helps you see through 
the illusions. 
Most "wins" are something less than a maximum possible or hypothet-
ical "best case" outcome. The ability to defme goals and objectives there-
fore includes knowing not only the conditions of a complete victory, but the 
importance of the smaller and more intermediate wins that increase the 
probability of your ultimate success or lay the groundwork for future suc-
cesses. "Going for it all" when the risks are high, financial or psychological 
costs significant, and the possibilities of achieving the desired outcome low 
is something that can backfire and bankrupt. While your goals need to be 
high, they must be reasonable and realistic. "Going for broke" is fine when 
that is the client's stated goal after sound legal counseling, but is not ac-
ceptable unless the odds of success are in your favor. 
The process of setting goals is difficult, opaque, shifting, and imper-
fect. Too often we get caught up in a conflict and forget that it is only a 
means to an end. While winning is at the heart of strategy, the real nature of 
victory in a specific interaction is a slippery phenomenon. Part of strategy is 
being able to know when you have won or lost. We all have seen grand 
masters in chess who are able to look at the board and tell whether they 
have won or lost five or six moves ahead of the actual endgame. Knowing 
whether you have won or lost requires, however, that you understand the 
meaning of victory or at least know when it is necessary and possible to cut 
your losses and save resources for another time, which is another form of 
victory. 
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B. Evaluation Principle# 2: Determine the Path of Dispute Resolution that 
Offers the Best Chance to Achieve the Client's Goals 
The first question we should ask when faced with the possibility of tri-
al is whether it represents the wisest choice from among the available op-
tions that include negotiation, mediation, binding and non-binding arbitra-
tion, some other alternative strategies such as a private "rental" judge or 
demonstrative "mini-trial" and trial. True victory is nearly always some-
thing less than optimal. This means that there is no single "best" outcome 
that can be known in the earliest phases of a dispute. Being able to evaluate 
a dispute as it unfolds depends on not only understanding your side of the 
dispute but obtaining critical intelligence information through research, fact 
investigation, records review and witness reports. Conducting this process 
of intelligence gathering and being able to assess the import of the results 
while weaving everything together as part of a strategic package are critical 
skills for the lawyer. It also means the lawyer must help the client see that 
what is desired may not be achievable or, if it is, that it can be won only at a 
cost the client cannot afford. This is among the most important aspects of 
trial strategy and other aspects of legal strategy. 
Victory must be defined not in terms of what is wished for as a maxi-
mum outcome but in terms of what is realistically achievable within the 
conditions and dynamics of the available processes. Pragmatic decisions 
must be made that take into account the skills and resources available to you 
compared with those within the control of the opponent. There will be situa-
tions in which the absolute maximum and the pragmatic determination of 
the probable outcome are the same, but that occurs less than we might hope. 
There are times when the "battle" must be fought and "war" is una-
voidable. But given the potential "all or nothing" gambit that many trials 
represent, the lawyer will generally determine that while the threat or possi-
bility of trial is a very important component of the arsenal, the uncertainty 
associated with trial continues to offer the impetus that ultimately results in 
compromise and settlement in nearly all legal disputes. This means, howev-
er, that "victory" is rarely the absolute "best" that might be accomplished if 
everything fell into place perfectly in the client's strategic path. 
A result is that the lawyer can't afford to be deceived by the lure of 
ideal or even highly desirable goals. The desires of a lawyer's client to 
achieve a specific end must be taken into account in creating strategic goals, 
but the lawyer fails if the desired goals are not realistic. The possibility of 
trial is a substantial source of pressure because control over the outcome is 
taken away from the disputing parties. But doing a trial is a high risk and 
costly strategy. It should be used only when you have positioned your case 
for victory or are given no realistic alternative in terms of your honest eval-
uation of the case. 
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C. Evaluation Principle# 3: Educate Clients in the Fact that "Wars" Are 
Costly and People Get Hurt 
Trial is quite often the wrong course of action, one that imposes un-
necessary costs on both parties. Lawyers should never forget that trial is 
expensive, labor intensive, and emotionally draining for clients, families, 
witnesses, and employees. Trial is often destructive for clients on both 
sides, and ultimately uncertain in outcome. Trial outcomes are inherently 
uncertain because trial outcomes depend on the capabilities, qualities, per-
ception, and values of other people, and on the skills and knowledge of law-
yers, clients, and witnesses. There are no outcome guarantees at trial, only 
greater and lesser probabilities. Even this depends on accurate and honest 
assessments by the lawyer. 
This is one of the places where the ideal of professional service and 
the economic reality of practice come into play. In terms of a fair case eval-
uation for a client in a disputed matter, few clients can afford to pay the full 
costs of litigation or even a substantial portion of the costs involved in fees, 
expenses, expert witnesses, costs, and the like. Along with this goes the fact 
that a lawyer's overall caseload can be too heavy to allow full preparation of 
the kind a case theoretically requires. In the finite universe of law practice, 
one bounded by the limited time a lawyer has to spend on all the matters 
represented in his or her caseload, few clients can afford to pay for the full 
costs of litigation. Regardless of lawyers' frequent rhetoric about going to 
trial, "something has to give" and that "something" almost inevitably repre-
sents trade-offs and short cuts on the various cases for which the lawyer is 
responsible. The result is that the idea of full and complete trial preparation 
is a myth except (perhaps) in the instances where the lawyers are funded by 
wealthy corporate clients or well-heeled and staffed public institutions. 
D. Evaluation Principle# 4: Assess Whether the Situation Involves Siege 
Strategies by You or Your Opponent 
The form of any possible settlement approach, as well as whether set-
tlement is even possible, depends on a combination of factors. These in-
clude the stakes involved, the nature of the parties, and their relative re-
sources and "staying power." Some of the most troubling issues occur in the 
representation of large and powerful clients whose scale of operation and 
ability to withstand attacks by those arguably wronged result in a severe 
power imbalance to the extent that great harms can be imposed on helpless 
people without resources adequate to the task of obtaining even a semblance 
of justice. To the extent these powerful institutions rely on law and lawyers 
to protect them, a real issue emerges about the role of lawyers in working 
affirmatively both as counselors and guides that facilitate a client's ongoing 
activity in ways that help their clients to do things that predictably harm 
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large groups of people-and as advocates who serve their clients in dispute 
resolution. 
Fear of the verdicts reached by juries made up of regular people is also 
why defensive strategies typically involve imposing significant costs and 
delay on an opponent who generally has limited resources. The defense is 
like a besieged fortified city protected by high stone walls. Degrading the 
attacker's resources and will to keep on fighting in the face of high costs 
and increasing casualties either results in a collapse of the siege or the will-
ingness to agree to terms that are more favorable. A result is that many 
powerful defendants seek to avoid populist juries. They do so because they 
are often on the wrong side of the kinds of themes that trigger jury outrage. 
A defendant's bad faith, abuse of a trust relationship, severity or type of 
injuries caused by negligence or indifference, arrogance, greed, or callous-
ness all represent themes that lead to substantial verdicts. 
No lawyer can consistently predict the size of verdicts prior to trial. 
What causes compromises through negotiated settlements is that the lawyers 
cannot know for certain who will be on the jury. But they do know that ju-
rors will tend to be regular people who will view what happened in terms of 
the Golden Rule. The jurors will think about how they would want the de-
fendants to behave if they (the jurors) were, for example, on the operating 
table, helpless and forced to trust their well-being to doctors and hospitals. 
Similarly, almost any juror will have dealt with insurance companies and 
understand the tendency of many of the companies to try to get out from 
under their contractual obligations. When members of a jury decide a plain-
tiff with whom they can easily identify because he or she is an ordinary 
person like themselves has been harmed by greedy, malicious, or callous 
behavior on the part of a powerful actor in the case, they have a tendency to 
punish the large and powerful litigant who they decide has abused the "little 
guy." But although that risk is always present, there is no certainty that the 
jury will buy into the claimant's themes to the degree needed to achieve a 
high verdict. Certainly, a lawyer's skill and track record provides some 
sense of the probability, but each jury and trial is unique. 
E. Evaluation Principle# 5: Evaluate the Risks, Costs, and Uncertainty of 
Trial or Other Available or Mandated Forms of Dispute Resolution 
Many goals can be achieved through cooperation. There are what have 
been called "win-win" solutions to disputes. But even when there are not, it 
is possible to craft proposed solutions that make it appear that each interest 
in a dispute has obtained something of significant value. In order to resolve 
disputes that would otherwise never end short of trial, lawyers need to de-
termine how to present proposed outcomes in language that indicates their 
clients are obtaining something they value highly, or that a client is saving a 
great deal by settling because if the dispute went to an alternative forum for 
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resolution, the client would lose a great deal more. As suggested above, in 
many instances lawyers have not fully evaluated, analyzed, or prepared their 
clients' cases. 
This means that several dynamics are in play during settlement negoti-
ations. One is that the lawyer really does not know what an optimal out-
come should be-in essence is unaware of the worth of the case. Another 
dynamic is that while the lawyer does not know the value of the case, he 
does know that he has not done the necessary work to actually present the 
case effectively at trial. This results in a great deal of bluffing and posturing 
designed to generate the aura of substance and create a psychology of lever-
age, but in virtually all instances the fayade disappears on the eve of trial 
when to go through with the litigation would reveal the inadequacies of 
preparation and understanding. 
A trial is frequently the consequence of failed negotiations that ought 
to have resolved the dispute. But the problem is that it takes all sides to 
agree on a settlement, and there are various reasons, both good and bad, 
why agreement cannot be reached prior to trial. One quite common reason is 
that one side is pursuing an agenda that precludes peaceful resolution for 
reasons that may or may not be rational or well thought out. Another can be 
that reasonable outcome assessments relating to the value of a jury verdict 
relative to a settlement agreement are just too far apart. 
The jury, judges, or arbitrators possess the power to interpret what is 
offered by the lawyers and to choose the proper interpretation and outcome. 
Even the best trial lawyers can only estimate the probabilities of what they 
will do. But our ability to influence those choices depends on the degree to 
which we can persuade the decision makers by projecting a reconstructed 
"virtual reality" of what occurred along with offering a clear pathway to 
what they should do based on our advocate's vision of the appropriate out-
come. The virtual reality, however, is not the same as the "truth" of what 
actually occurred but the advocate's reconstruction of the original context 
into a frame of reference that projects the desired version of "reality." The 
assertion that trials are a search for truth is inaccurate. Trials are the pursuit 
of an outcome that is in your client's interest. 
Resource expenditure or exhaustion of a client's finances is not the 
only negative aspect of attempting to resolve legal disputes through trial. 
Trials are battlefields comprised of probability, risks, and uncertainty. There 
are no guarantees of being able to achieve the desired outcome or being able 
to achieve it with efficiency in relation to costs and benefits. Uncertainty 
permeates all phases of a trial. One critical fact of trial uncertainty is that 
you cannot know in advance how your witnesses will actually come across 
. on the stand, regardless of how well you have prepared them. Trial prepara-
tion is a form of strategic planning. 
Of course you do everything possible prior to trial within the bounds 
of resources and time. But even the most thorough case preparation and 
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planning is only practice or simulation. As with any situation involving con-
flict, as soon as you move from the pre-trial planning phase to implementa-
tion before actual authoritative decision makers, there is the inevitability of 
surprise, decision-maker bias, and impression that shapes your presentation, 
evidentiary rulings, emotive nuances, positive or negative reactions to your 
client or key witnesses, and much more to which you must adapt almost 
instinctively-all while operating within the trial version of the "fog of war" 
and extreme tension. 
You may, for example, not have anticipated the use of a particularly 
powerful theme by your opponent to which the jury is responding favorably. 
Or the thematic approach you thought would work well may be falling flat 
with the decision makers, requiring that you make judgments about an al-
ternative path of action. Even though you may have used your powers of 
visualization to anticipate positive and negative possibilities occurring, the 
harder task is that even with such preparation you must possess the skills of 
recognition and balance to understand what is occurring and react in a posi-
tive way to the opportunity or potential harm. 
Trials are risky because they are about how humans perceive the 
qualities, behaviors, and "likeability" of clients and witnesses far more than 
about legalities. It is far more a humanistic process than a legalistic one. 
Jurors, for example, are looking at you and your clients and assessing the 
people based on impressions derived from stereotypes and prejudices. They 
do not actually know the witnesses, clients, or lawyers or they would not be 
sitting on the jury. It may be that a juror's judgment on a client is based not 
on evidence, but on whether subconsciously the client strikes the juror as 
someone in the juror's experience about whom he or she holds a strongly 
positive or negative opinion. The idea that parties are entitled to have their 
case determined by a jury of their "peers" has little or nothing to do with the 
actual process. Or, alternatively, it may be that for some parties their peers 
are the last group of people they would want judging them. 
Nor can you know how the jury will evaluate the validity and econom-
ic worth of a disputed claim. Even if a jury opts for liability on behalf of a 
suing litigant, that is only a "necessary" but "not sufficient" outcome for the 
party seeking damages. This is particularly so when a damages claim in-
volves "soft" non-economic damages or economic damages that require the 
need to project future needs and consequences along with such things as 
inflation and interest rates, life spans or work-related pay increases project-
ed years into the future. As demonstrated in the earlier case examples, these 
types of damages offer very risky scenarios in which juries' choices can 
range from token damages even with a finding of liability to vastly multi-
plied financial levels that stun both lawyers and parties. Assessing, control-
ling, expanding, and contracting the risk and multiplier effects are key parts 
of the trial lawyer's skill. 
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A difficulty faced by all trial lawyers is that their party and other wit-
nesses will often seem calm, effective, and capable of testifying well when 
you are preparing them in your office but will be a surprisingly different 
person when in front of the judge and jury. When it happens it is a "Jeckyll 
and Hyde" experience in which your benign client becomes a monster. The 
problem is that a trial is a live performance. Unlike movies or television 
series, if mistakes are made at trial you do not get to stop the process, re-edit 
the script, and do it over again until you get it right. A trial is not only a live 
dramatic performance but one with amateur actors playing the key roles of 
jurors and witnesses. 
You cannot ever be quite certain what will happen. In the early phases 
of my career, I had a client who tried to physically attack witnesses in the 
courtroom whose testimony she did not like. While it was a judge-only trial, 
I am certain the fact that he had her shackled after the second assault did not 
work in her favor. I also had a client who had just flown in from out-of-state 
the day of trial who told me during the preparation of testimony that her 
mother-in-law had chased her out of the house with a .38 caliber revolver, 
and that is why she left her husband. Several hours later at trial she respond-
ed to my question, "Did your mother-in-law do anything the day you left 
that caused you to leave the house," with a flat, "No, there was no prob-
lem." This does not even touch the situations in which a client collapsed 
during testimony due to a bleeding ulcer and was whisked away in an ambu-
lance, or where an opposing husband in a divorce proceeding was grabbed 
by deputies as he tried to bring a sawed off shotgun from his briefcase. 
Nor does it present the situation where a client admitted after I handed 
over the settlement check that the version of what had happened in a con-
sumer dispute was not "quite" [not even close] what they had told me and 
that they just wanted to get out of the deal they had made. It also does not 
cover the case in which a client told me police had robbed him during a 
traffic stop. I met with the prosecutor, and he agreed to pay for a lie detector 
test and promised to file criminal charges against the police if the client 
passed. We observed the test from behind a one-way mirror, and the client 
was told at the end that there were questions about whether he was telling 
the truth. He then admitted that he was lying and had been angry with the 
police for stopping him and wanted to "get even." I thank the God of law-
yers that when asked whether I knew anything about the lie that he told the 
truth and said "no." 
It never ends. In a drug case my defendant client told me an idiotic 
story about what had occurred, and I responded by telling him it was stupid 
and unbelievable. He responded, "I thought I would try it out on you, and if 
you bought it I would run with that version." Or consider a case where dur-
ing an initial jail interview with a prospective client he denied having any-
thing to do with the armed robbery in question. Then after speaking with the 
prosecutor, I went back to the client and told him the witness/victim had 
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said not only was the client the robber but that he had used a .38 caliber 
handgun during the robbery. The client's indignant response, "He's lying. It 
was a sawed-off." The point is that there is no substitute for experience, nor 
is experience enough in itself because many people never manage to learn 
from experience and keep making the same mistakes. 
In the intense and high-stakes world of effective trial advocacy, skill 
helps, resources are useful, and evidence and law are important. But it all 
comes down to the lawyer's ability to influence, shape, and persuade the 
strange combination of individual and collective judgments made by jurors 
who are hearing this particular case involving these facts, parties, and wit-
nesses for the first time. A lawyer can't tell for sure about a case until actu-
ally in the midst of the trial process and the members of the jury can be seen 
smiling or nodding in agreement when one witness is testifying, but not 
when your client or key witness is on the witness stand. Or your client 
might be a saint who has the misfortune of looking or sounding like some-
body who tortures cuddly little animals. Even then, nothing is certain until it 
is done and the verdict has been returned. 
There is an irrational element to jury decision making. Losing a case 
may be as simple as your key witness speaking in a way this specific jury 
does not like. Voir dire is a limited device for selecting jurors and in any 
event we tend to focus on jury selection as if it were an individualized pro-
cess when in fact it depends on the interactive dynamics of small group de-
cision making. Even though another jury might react differently, you have 
to deal with the values, prejudices, and attitudes of this jury. Depending on 
the side being represented, whether we are dealing with a civil or criminal 
case, and the allocation of the burden of proof, the focus is on evaluating the 
probability of being able to influence the vote of a specific number of ju-
rors. Only if the advocate is representing the government in a criminal case 
is it necessary to achieve small group unanimity. 
Even the best lawyers cannot guarantee their clients what a jury will 
do. With a jury all we can do is give our best guess or estimate, and quote 
percentages and probabilities. The ultimate uncertainty regarding what the 
jury's decision will be and the willingness to surrender control to the jury 
over what happens provides the force that drives the process of dispute reso-
lution. Large institutions, for example, will do almost anything to avoid 
having a case decided by a jury because they know the jury will tend to 
come down against them. 
This is why such institutions are increasingly writing binding arbitra-
tion clauses into employment contracts and consumer agreements. The arbi-
tration provisions typically include the potential for being required to pay a 
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defendant's legal fees and costs if you press an unsuccessful claim. 61 This 
not only generates a chilling effect on the willingness to use arbitration, but 
given that arbitrators know parties have veto power over selection of arbi-
trators and that arbitral plaintiffs tend to be "one-shot" users while organiza-
tional defendants offer repeated users of arbitration services, the large insti-
tutional repeat users of arbitration are likely to be viewed more sympatheti-
cally from the perspective of the arbitrators if they want future appoint-
ments. 
F. Evaluation Principle# 6: Be Realistic About Outcome Probabilities and 
Collectability 
Part of knowing how you should proceed with a particular strategic 
path depends on the amount of risk the client is willing or able to accept. If 
a client with a legal problem was dealing with an investment counselor ra-
ther than a lawyer, the prospective investor should expect to be asked how 
much return is wanted or needed, and what degree of protection or safety 
the individual desires in the investment program. The range of investment 
options would vary from the most highly speculative and leveraged invest-
ments that would bring very significant returns if everything turned out 
right, to bank certificates of deposit insured by the federal government. 
There would be little risk of loss with the CDs, but the investment return 
would be relatively low. With the most speculative investments the investor 
runs the risk of losing the entire investment, plus, if the investments are 
heavily leveraged, might face disaster if forced to cover the losses. The up-
side is a big win, but the downside can be catastrophic. 
Collectability is one of the most basic questions that must be asked in 
evaluating a dispute or potential transaction. Working out the paper value of 
a case or the probability of success on the merits is only a preliminary step. 
On paper a case could be worth $30 million with a 100 percent probability 
of obtaining a verdict in that amount, but if the collectable assets of the op-
posing party (or limits of insurance coverage) are much lower or even non-
61. JAMS CLAUSE WORKBOOK: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
CLAUSES FOR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (20 II), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/clauses/. In discussing the potentially negative side effects of medi-
ation and arbitration the JAMS service notes: 
It is common practice for a contract clause to provide for negotiation and/or media-
tion in advance of arbitration. There is much to recommend such clauses because 
they represent by far the most cost-effective means of resolving a dispute and 
since, in fact, they often lead to a cost-effective, early settlement. Unless drafted 
with care, however, such clauses can also have negative side effects since they can 
be a vehicle for delay and can result in required but empty negotiations where one 
or all parties have no intention of moving toward a settlement. 
/d. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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existent, the paper represented by the verdict is worthless unless there is 
hope for the opposing client improving their financial situation and for the 
claim to be of a character not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The good lawyer 
seeks to understand the real resource conditions under which opposing cli-
ents are operating in order to know not only how hard and long they can 
afford to fight, but what resources exist to satisfy judgments. If you cannot 
collect the money, the paper value is little more than symbolic. 
G. Evaluation Principle# 7: Risk/Benefit Analysis and Cost Assessment 
Which path of strategic action is more expensive, and what do we 
mean by expense? There are various ways to look at the expense of a strate-
gic path. How do you measure real cost versus apparent cost? The expense 
of taking a case to trial is generally much greater in terms of money ex-
pended and the time and energy consumed in the process than are the other 
strategic paths. The higher expenses are produced both by the added thor-
oughness and intensity of the preparatory phases required to try a case, and 
the effort involved in the trial and appeal. 
Questions you need to ask include: How much can your client afford 
to pay? How much can your opponent afford to pay? Is the opponent's law-
yer obtaining his money up front? If so, what will be left for you and your 
client after a long and hotly contested struggle? If the opposing lawyers are 
not receiving all their money up front, as opposed to periodic payments, and 
it is a non-contingency defense case without a deep-pocket client, then if 
you impose significant costs by forcing the action early and the defendant's 
attorney is a "hand to mouth" general practitioner, how long will they be 
able to carry that client? As the bills for legal fees and expenses mount up, 
when will the case's "sticker shock" hit the opposing client? 
In determining the true costs of a case, we need to visualize a balance 
sheet, revenues on one side and expenses on the other. This requires identi-
fying which path of strategic action creates the greatest outcome potential, 
as well as the risks involved in achieving that potential. Taking a case 
through trial may, for example, be twice as expensive as negotiation, say 
$25,000 versus $12,500. But what if you feel there is a ninety percent prob-
ability you can achieve a $300,000 verdict at trial and that you have essen-
tially reached the limits of the defendant's willingness to pay after a defense 
offer of $100,000 only a week before trial? Even though the defense may 
increase their offer to $125,000 at trial, the most desirable strategic path is 
likely to be to try the case because of the differential between your expecta-
tion of $300,000 and the defendant's probable offer of $125,000. Part of the 
decision turns on the quality ofyour evaluation of a ninety percent probabil-
ity of a $300,000 verdict, its collectability, the likelihood of appeal, and the 
significant gap between your expectation and the defendant's offer. 
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A lawyer is responsible for evaluating the case for the client in terms 
of its legal and financial viability, and the unavoidable costs that must be 
paid by the client. These costs, and the realistic outcome probability, nearly 
always reduce the "face value" or apparent worth of the case. If, for exam-
ple, there is only a ten percent chance of winning a $50,000 case but the 
lawyer will generate $10,000-$13,000 dollars worth of billable hours and 
the client must pay an additional $7,000 in expenses, then the client de-
serves to be told the case is not worth pursuing unless he or she can afford 
the expense or it is a matter of principle for which the client is willing to 
pay. The equation the client needs to see is (.1 0 x $50,000 = $5,000) -
$13,000- $7,000 =- $15,000 in probable outcome. The considerations also 
shift if you are handling the case on a contingent fee basis because, for the 
client at least, this reduces the amount they have to pay in attorney fees un-
less the case is successful. In our example if the $10,000-$13,000 in fees is 
converted to one-third of whatever is actually recovered, then the cost to the 
plaintiff may or may not shift in absolute terms, but the obligation to pay is 
contingent. 
Provided with this information many clients would choose to not pur-
sue their claim if an hourly fee was involved. But as the probability of re-
covery increases to a sixty or seventy percent level, the calculation shifts. 
Similarly, so does the probability of a lower, but less expensive, outcome 
through settlement. There are differences between the outcome potential of 
a negotiated settlement and the outcome potential of a trial. For a negotiator, 
the problem is how to keep the opponent uncertain concerning the low out-
come probability of your case at trial, so that they will be willing to pay you 
$20,000 to settle the case. This is why so much of legal strategy is about 
creating false impressions, reinforcing an opponent's expectations, and con-
cealing the weaknesses of your case. 
Of course there are numerous variables involved in many law cases, 
but civil cases can be looked at as investment vehicles with identifiable 
risks, characteristics, and costs of doing business. We need to do a better job 
of explaining these factors to our clients. An example of risk and opportuni-
ty assessment is provided by a jury verdict against Owens-Coming in which 
four plaintiffs sued Owens-Coming for disease caused by their long-term 
workplace exposure to asbestos. A New York jury returned a verdict of 
$64.65 million.62 Corporate monetization of others' lives leads to jury out-
62. The case is summarized in a report in the National Law Journal. See Verdicts: 
The Big Numbers of 1995: Four Asbestos Plaintiffs are Awarded $64.65 Million for Personal 
Injury, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 8. The report indicates: "On Dec. 6, 1995, a New York 
jury awarded the four plaintiffs one of the largest asbestos awards ever-a total of $64.65 
million. The largest share, $22.4 million, went to Mr. Falloon. The other awards were: Mr. 
Karasik, $16 million; Mr. DeBerardinis, $15 million; Mr. Pankowitz, $11.2 million." ld. 
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rage, and the jury, as representatives of the community of ordinary human 
beings, then says: ''Now we will make you pay for what you did." 
The problem with a case such as Owens-Corning and the issue of pu-
nitive damages that is frequently the largest element in such jury awards is 
that it would be virtually impossible to completely resolve the case short of 
trial. Regardless of what he might have hoped, there was no way the plain-
tiffs' lawyers could have guaranteed or even expected that the jury would 
buy into the compensatory and punitive damages themes and analysis. Nor, 
prior to the verdict, would the lawyers for Owens-Corning ever seriously 
fear that verdict would be rendered or be able to convince Owens-Corning 
that its exposure was on that scale. 
The competing estimations of settlement ranges in such a case are 
simply so far apart there is no overlapping and no real chance of settlement. 
Each side is therefore taking an enormous speculative risk. Owens-Corning 
itself simply wouldn't be able to deal in those terms or believe a jury was 
likely to come back with such an enormous punitive verdict. Defense law-
yers will not be able to believe in that possibility until it has not only hap-
pened several times at the trial level but been upheld on appeal. Ford Mo-
tors has been hit with a series of multi-million dollar jury verdicts for rollo-
ver defects in its SUVs.63 Such judgments can be expected to eventually 
affect Ford's evaluation of its potential exposure in pending cases, as well 
as those of other plaintiffs in similar situations. This is because each side 
now has a different perspective on what is realistic and possible. Until the 
pattern of liability and scale of damages becomes clear, the outcome poten-
tials and probabilities are seen by both sides in such disputes as being so 
radically different that pretrial settlement is very unlikely. In such situa-
tions, resort to trial is almost inevitable. 
Although there are serious abuses by some lawyers that are committed 
both consciously and without deliberate intent, most lawyers are simply 
trying to do a good job for their clients. The problem is that a lawyer costs a 
considerable amount of money, and clients do not see what they do because 
much of a lawyer's work is invisible. Few clients understand how much 
time good lawyers spend on research, investigation, depositions, and other 
forms of discovery, case preparation, etc. in the effort to help solve their 
problems and disputes. Sometimes there is no solution to client resentment 
even when the lawyer has been completely honest and specific at all stages. 
People who themselves have no difficulty charging significant sums for 
their own services-mechanics, plumbers, doctors, contractors, business 
people-somehow feel entitled to extremely low cost legal representation. 
Knowing the likelihood of client resentment of legal fees and expenses, a 
63. See cases discussed in Howard Latin and Bobby Kasolas, Bad Designs, Lethal 
Profits: The Duty to Protect Other Motorists Against SUV Collision Risks, 82 B. U. L. REV. 
1161 (2002). 
404 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:347 
lawyer should take care to send clients regular updates of activities, charges, 
and expenses, even if operating pursuant to a contingent fee contract. 
The full costs of representation, including inevitable and unavoidable 
costs, the most probable costs, and the contingent costs that depend on how 
the opponent proceeds and which path of strategy is successful should be 
specified to the extent possible at the beginning, or as soon as they become 
reasonably obvious. Otherwise, a lawyer can expect client complaints to bar 
associations and grievance committees as well as loss of "word of mouth" 
recommendations and referrals that can be provided by satisfied former 
clients. 
H. Evaluation Principle# 8: Accounting for the "Fog of War" 
The fog of war is a natural human reaction when encountering intense, 
dangerous or chaotic situations in which the consequences of success and 
failure are high.64 The fog blocks our ability to perceive accurately and time-
ly. This prevents us from making the instantaneous decisions needed to 
function well. Stress, fear, emotion, uncertainty, and chaos are generated by 
conflict and goal seeking. These emotions and the corresponding tendency 
toward over reliance on pre-developed plans of action tend to inhibit our 
ability to perceive clearly, and to understand what is happening at an early 
enough point where we can defend against others' actions or take positive 
actions that advance our strategies. 
The fog of war is a constant consideration and danger for the trial law-
yer. A recent example involved a case on which I was consulting. The law-
yer had spent two years working on the client's civil dispute and had re-
searched and prepared in great depth. He clearly understood the facts, is-
sues, and nuances. Yet on his opening statement he forgot to present the 
client's counterclaim and did nothing to remedy the oversight until a con-
siderably later point in the trial. The judge ruled at that point that his omis-
sion had waived the counterclaim and refused to allow any instructions or 
argument to the jury based on that claim. The plaintiff in the case had 
sought more than $850,000 in damages, and the defendant-client had been 
counting on the counterclaim to set off against any recovery. 
The plaintiff was in fact an extremely dislikeable person to the extent 
that the bailiff later admitted he heard the jury stating how much they dis-
liked her. The outcome was a $20,000 verdict for plaintiff, but the jury also 
attempted to render a separate verdict for the client-defendant. The judge 
informed the jury that they could not give anything to the defendant due to 
the fact that there was no counterclaim before them, and sent the jury back 
64. For an intriguing analysis of the derivation of the concept "fog of war," see 
Eugenia C. Kiesling, On War: Without the Fog, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 85, available 
at http://www.clausewitz.comlbibl/Kiesling-OnFog.pdf. 
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in to finalize the verdict. The defendant was understandably upset with his 
lawyer and demanded the return of an $8,000 fee payment he had recently 
made and informed the lawyer he would not pay him any fee for the week in 
trial. The pressure of trial made an otherwise competent lawyer "choke" at 
trial and cost himself and his client a substantial amount of money. This is 
the fog of war. 
I. Evaluation Principle # 9: Sometimes Settlement is Not Possible 
How do you decide whether to attempt to resolve a dispute through 
"alternative" means or pursue litigation? Among the key questions respon-
sible advocates must ask are: "What does my client want or need and what 
is the best way to achieve an outcome consistent with my client's desires 
with the least expenditure of resources?" Diagnose, plan, prepare, evaluate, 
reevaluate, and acquire information continuously. This includes various 
forms of intelligence gathering, including "spying." Information accessing, 
development, distillation, and refining are at the core of effective strategy. 
They are also expensive and time consuming. 
Well-funded defense strategists approach litigation with the attitude of 
imposing significant costs on the opponent through what is called "paper-
ing" the case through discovery, investigation, and continual motions that 
require responses.65 This often exhausts plaintiffs' resources and forces law-
yers to make choices about how much time and money they can afford to 
put into a case. Obviously this is affected by upfront assessments by the 
lawyers about the nature of the opponent, the amount that can realistically 
be sought, the probabilities and risks relating to achieving a particular out-
come, and the costs of the type of case. Cases with significant medical is-
sues projected across multiple clients may offer the appearance of very sig-
nificant returns over time but can easily become "money pits" in which 
large sums are sunk that might never be recovered. 
In such cases preparing and deposing the medical experts and related 
witnesses may easily run costs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
long before the end game is reached. One result in many cases depending on 
client resources and realistic potential outcome is that some investigation is 
not done and some information that might have been critical in determining 
65. The history of tobacco litigation offers an example of this strategy. It is argued: 
[T]he tobacco companies were also successful in using their size and financial 
strength to make litigation as difficult as possible for the plaintiffs. The tobacco in-
dustry filed and argued every conceivable motion, took countless depositions, and 
sent out extensive interrogatories. As a result, it was extremely burdensome and 
expensive for plaintiffs and their attorneys to pursue their cases. 
Tobacco-Tobacco Litigation, JRANK.ORG, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1 0805/Tobacco-
Tobacco-Litigation.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
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the outcome never uncovered. In other situations plaintiff-oriented law 
firms carefully screen cases prior to agreeing to represent the clients be-
cause they are going to have to front the significant costs involved as well 
as handle the cases on contingency arrangements that require provision of 
their legal services without fee payments in the expectation that they will 
gain from the ultimate settlement or jury verdict. If recovery is not made, 
the lawyers "eat" large amounts of costs and other expenses and have essen-
tially donated hundreds or thousands of hours of time without compensa-
tion. 
As business entities, lawyers and law firms cannot be expected to han-
dle such cases without the realistic expectation of return on the investment 
required. Sophisticated analyses therefore go into plaintiffs' lawyers' deci-
sions about whether to even accept a complex case on a contingency fee 
basis. On one level this is absolutely reasonable. But when lawyers take 
such cases anticipating relatively minimal or low-level settlements as being 
the norm-not because of the disputes' real value but the lawyers' balanc-
ing of the "package" of cases they are handling-they have betrayed the 
client unless this has been a clear part of the discussion prior to the agree-
ment for representation. 
Consider that in any case there are themes and facts that are critical 
determinants. If they are in your favor, then it helps in the process of evalu-
ating the potential outcome and deciding whether to settle or take the case to 
trial. If they are against you and you do not have countering or mitigating 
themes of substantial power, then it assists in your own evaluation of the 
dispute, including what appears to be a good settlement on your client's 
behalf. Along with a dispute's "thematic" power there are often specific 
facts that may work either for or against you. These are often ones in which 
you ask yourself how "real" people would view certain facts and considera-
tions, and whether they would be compassionate, angry, disgusted, or in 
some other strong emotional state that helps or hurts your client's interests. 
Such considerations do much to shape your evaluation and strategy, 
including placing a price tag on a dispute's value whether through settle-
ment or trial. These valuations are different due to the higher risk factors 
that are present in trials even if the thematic and factual considerations ap-
pear to clearly be on your side. It is when the gap between what is judged to 
be the dispute's value in settlement versus the considerably higher valuation 
through trial, even after risk and probability discounting, are so far apart 
that a trial offers the only realistic mechanism. Look at the following exam-
ples and consider the key thematic and factual considerations that appear to 
have been in play and that virtually guaranteed that settlement or ADR were 
not viable options from the plaintiffs' point of view. 
In Warren, Ohio a jury returned a $13.9 million award to a ten-year-
old girl and her family in a medical malpractice suit. The child has cerebral 
palsy due to a lack of oxygen during delivery, with the claim being that the 
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dangerous condition was evident on the monitors during the birthing pro-
cess but ignored by the obstetrician. The girl's life span is projected to be in 
the normal range, meaning that she requires a lengthy lifetime of expensive 
medical treatment. The award is the highest ever in the area in such a case, 
surpassing an $8.5 million verdict in the wrongful death of a six-year-old 
child. A key factor is that the same lawyer represented plaintiffs in both 
cases. Key Considerations: a. ten-year-old little girl with another sixty to 
seventy years of "normal" life; b. the little girl was in the courtroom and the 
jurors could see the consequences; c. defendants presumed to be able to pay 
a significant amount; d. brain damage caused by lack of oxygen; e. jurors 
could see themselves or their children or loved ones in that kind of a situa-
tion;! the monitors showed the problem; g. the doctor ignored the problem; 
h. we are told to trust doctors and to place our lives in their hands; i. the 
plaintiff's lawyer had won a high verdict in the jurisdiction in a similar case. 
In another medical malpractice case in New York City, the pregnant 
mother began bleeding during labor, and it was overlooked and not properly 
investigated by the delivery room personnel. The bleeding resulted in severe 
oxygen deprivation in one of the twins she was in the process of delivering. 
There were indications of problems with the first-born infant, but the staff 
still did not rush the delivery of the second born twin. The child suffered 
severe brain damage. A Brooklyn jury returned a verdict of $47.3 million. 
Key Considerations: a. a breach of the trust we put in doctors since we are 
at the mercy of their skills; b. the effects of brain damage on our sense of 
the quality of life with which the plaintiff is left; c. delay in the medical 
staff's actions even though there were already indicators of a problem; d. 
our fear of brain damage; e. ability to depict the effects graphically; f sym-
pathy for a mother whose child was needlessly harmed. 
The infamous and often criticized McDonald's "hot coffee" case of-
fers another example. It is often used as a way to demonstrate the supposed 
irrationality of runaway juries in a litigious society. The problem is that it 
was not an irrational jury decision based on a full review of the evidence. 
Evidence from McDonald's internal documents revealed what had occurred 
represented the classic corporate tradeoff between a known potential for 
harm and risk to the user of the Company's product, in this case hot coffee 
sold to people in the "platform" of a moving vehicle rather than a stable 
restaurant table. The temperature at which McDonald's marketing data indi-
cated the Company's coffee outperformed sales relative to other fast food 
chains was substantially higher than the other chains. This provided 
McDonalds with a clear sales advantage even though the hotter coffee cre-
ated a greater risk of serious burns. McDonalds made the decision to allo-
cate the risks of burns to its consumers purchasing coffee through the drive-
in window option while reaping the higher profits. Key Considerations: a. 
McDonald's had been put on notice of other bums caused by its coffee at 
drive through service windows; b. the company had already made an inter-
408 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:347 
na1 decision that the profit realized from having hotter coffee than its rivals 
was worth the risks of being held liable for bums any patrons suffered; c. a 
jury would find a ruthless corporate decision-making process that placed 
profit above customers' safety to be actionable; d. the members of the jury 
could see themselves in the same situation and resent being treated by the 
corporation as a faceless cost of doing business in order to enhance profits. 
In such a situation it is very difficult if not impossible for the compet-
ing lawyers to be on the same page in determining how to proceed and to 
evaluate the most important risks and outcome possibilities. If there is a 
series of similar cases that shows a trend in one way or another then there is 
a frame of reference or benchmark that can be used to evaluate the case. 
Otherwise the lawyers are in limbo with no firm guidance. 
J. Evaluation Principle# 10: The Psychology of the "Eve of Trial" 
Settlement 
The large scale trade-offs between multiple cases that require attention 
and the demands of full trial preparation and performance in the allocation 
of your time is one reason few lawyers actually want to try a case. Unless 
they have an extremely wealthy client or are part of a governmental institu-
tion that has committed significant resources to the dispute, they do not 
have the time or incentive to put other work aside. No matter what they say 
during negotiation, most lawyers are still patching their case together on the 
eve of trial. 
This is why many settlements occur at trial or a little way into trial 
when all bluffs have been called and/or lack of adequate preparation catches 
up to one or both sides. The lawyers know they are not prepared for more 
than an opening statement and perhaps the examination of one or two wit-
nesses, and do not want the embarrassment of being exposed as a profes-
sionally inept character. It is also a fact that until they are impaneled a jury 
is a hypothetical entity. You hope you can seat one kind of jury but some-
times you cannot get what you want and sense that the jurors as final deci-
sion makers in the case are not likely to go in your favor. When this hap-
pens cases sometimes settle during trial, but even this is based on assump-
tions about the particular jury rather than any certainty. 
K. Evaluation Principle # 11: Knowing Self and the Decision Makers 
If we know others, and observe and understand their strengths and 
weaknesses, we can better see and evaluate our own context. This includes 
others' perceptions of us, and how they respond to us. No matter how per-
ceptive we are or think we are, everyone is deceived about something at 
some time. We are often deceived because we want to be deceived, or at 
least want to avoid confronting something unpleasant about ourselves or our 
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preferred vision of things. There are many things we want to believe about 
ourselves, about the world, and other people. Self-deception is an important 
coping mechanism for everyday life. It allows us to blur the harshest edges 
of reality. We create illusions to mask reality, to retain our cherished beliefs, 
and to make us feel better. The lawyer cannot afford to have illusions be-
cause illusions are really delusions. There is a price to pay for the clarity 
that is an essential quality of the lawyer's perception, but if you want to be 
an effective lawyer it must be paid. 
It is not enough to study your opponent in gathering intelligence in-
formation. You need to literally put yourself in a state of mind so that you 
are able to develop your opponent's strategy. Put yourself in the opposing 
lawyer's place, although that is not enough. Acquiring essential strategic 
knowledge requires that you master a wide variety of roles and perspectives. 
It is almost as if you develop the ability to occupy multiple personalities, 
except that you are fully aware of all you are doing and apply the insights 
gained to more effective representation of your client. One critical perspec-
tive is that you must become your opponent in order to understand the issues 
and consequences from that perspective and get beyond your own subjectiv-
ity. Not only must you understand self in the sense of strengths and weak-
nesses, but be able to perceive the motivations and values of key decision 
makers. Depending on the type of dispute and the stage at which it is at any 
particular moment this can include analyzing the behaviors and motivations 
of judges, arbitrators, or jurors. But along with this goes the need to under-
stand the perspectives of opposing clients who are the decision makers who 
have to approve settlements. You do not simply prepare your side of a con-
test, but need to visualize the entire case from the perspective of your adver-
sary. This allows you to see yourself and your weaknesses and strengths in a 
different light. This means we must know how the world functions. Then 
we put ourselves into the perspectives and frames of reference of our oppo-
nents in order to see into the opponent and into ourselves. Ask yourself such 
questions as: "What are my opponent's strengths? What would he/she per-
ceive my weaknesses and strengths to be? How would the opponent evaluate 
our side? How is he/she likely to think he/she can best manipulate me and 
my client?" 
The concept used here includes not only actual legal adversaries, but 
potential adversaries and even those who declare themselves to be neutral. 
Allies or seeming friends may be using you as a stalking horse. A neutral 
posture can be a sham or, even if in good faith when created, only tempo-
rary and capable of shifting as the stakes change or deals are cut by you or 
your opponents. Potential adversaries can be standing on the sidelines, hop-
ing to step in after you and your opponent have exhausted yourselves. Ra-
ther than expend their own resources, they are letting you use up yours. 
You need, for example, to be able to see how people of the kind that 
will be the ultimate decision makers will evaluate the facts and the witness-
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es. A trial lawyer tends to become too close to the facts and people involved 
in a dispute and thus suffers from excessive subjectivity that interferes with 
the ability to understand how the decision makers will perceive the dispute. 
To overcome the inevitable subjectivity the trial lawyer needs to seek oth-
ers' impressions, views, and emotional reactions to the facts, themes, and 
people of the case. To do this you must develop the ability to become the 
decision makers. This requires that you put yourself inside the analytical, 
motivational, experiential, and emotional worlds of the people who will 
decide the outcome and look at it through their awareness and system of 
valuation and choice. When you do this you will know how to adapt your 
strategy to present it to those decision makers in a way they will understand 
and accept as valid. 
Becoming the decision maker does not only involve understanding the 
values and perceptions of judges, jurors, or arbitrators. It also includes de-
termining the motivations, expectations, needs, and values of the principals 
on the other side of the dispute or opportunity. This is because they will 
ultimately decide if there is to be a settlement or a deal of some kind, 
whether pre-trial, during trial, or on appeal. It is important to understand 
how they will view the terms, and the people. Being aware of what out-
comes they fear or the consequences of gain or loss is part of the evaluative 
process. Ask yourself if regardless of what they might like to do personally, 
do they have a constituency they have to appease, placate, or impress? 
Another factor in choosing a path involves the nature of the decision 
makers who accept or reject offers in that path. Negotiation, for example, 
will often not be the best path for a plaintiff to reach an outcome involving 
the highest amount of damages. This is particularly so if the damages are 
"soft" and involve pain and suffering, loss of quality of life, punitive dam-
ages, projected future medical expenses, and other non-economic damages. 
The idea is that these can be driven upward by jury sentiment, indignation, 
or outrage at a defendant's callous behavior. In such situations, trial may 
offer by far the highest outcome potential for the most severely harmed in-
dividuals. But the unpredictability and the sometimes ali-or-nothing risk 
that many trials involve is a limiting factor. We can think of the distinction 
as that of outcome probability contrasted with outcome potential. Probabil-
ity and risk must be considered in determining a case's true value. 
Any case needs to be discounted by a responsible assessment of the 
risk factors associated with taking the case all the way through a trial ver-
dict, and subsequent appeal. One way a plaintiffs lawyer can hedge the bet 
for the client is to sue multiple defendants when appropriate, and settle with 
some of them prior to trial. In that situation, the plaintiff already has a guar-
anteed win, and can afford to go for broke against the remaining defendants. 
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L. Evaluation Principle# 12: Understanding and Using Timing and Rhythm 
Each process moves at different speeds and rhythms. Does the lawyer 
want a speedy resolution or a lengthy delay? Speed stands not only for the 
quickness, but the slowness, of case resolution. Negotiation can resolve a 
case in moments, or take years even if being done in good faith. Arbitration 
has its own pace and rhythm, more compressed and accelerated than is 
found in trials. If a mediator is brought in early in a dispute when the parties 
say: "We have a problem and are hitting each other over the head without 
getting anywhere. Let's involve a mediator and see if we can get it taken 
care of," then it can resolve the situation quickly, or it may not work at all. 
On the other hand, good faith negotiation and mediation can be considered 
successful if parties learn important things about the case, including whether 
settlement is likely. A successful negotiation does not necessarily require a 
settlement. 
Law cases have predictable cycles and characteristics. The existence 
of a rhythm means that each path requires a specific set of behaviors as it 
unfolds. If you do not settle a dispute quickly, for example, a different set-
tlement rhythm takes hold. If a plaintiff files pleadings, then negotiation still 
takes place, but it is a different kind of negotiation. Litigation negotiation 
becomes part of, and is responsive to, the formal rhythms and timing sched-
ules imposed by litigation rules and judicial practices. It is therefore distinct 
from non-litigation, primarily transactional negotiation, and pre-litigation 
negotiation. The parties will become part of the timing patterns dictated by 
the rules rather than being in control of their own timing. When litigation 
occurs the process to some extent takes over key aspects of the case. When 
the formal rules are invoked the processes of regulated litigation are more in 
control of what is happening. This includes creation of the primary pressure 
points at which settlement is most likely. 
Each strategic path has its internal mechanisms for generating pressure 
and costs. There are channels within cases created by the system of informal 
and formal dispute resolution that allow for the steady building of pressure 
on the disputing parties as they approach the prescribed deadlines and tasks 
demanded by the rules of litigation and procedure. As you move along the 
formal processes, the channels through which you act become increasingly 
narrower. Bottlenecks develop that intensify pressure as they approach and 
then decompress the pressure if the parties do not settle. The pressure may 
be high at initial stages, low for a significant period afterward, and then 
build as the lawyers perform the intermediate tasks of case preparation and 
exploratory negotiation against a backdrop of a process that is moving 
steadily toward trial or binding arbitration if the parties cannot agree. These 
rhythms and pressures are built into the process. But failing to resolve dis-
putes at these points creates a new situation in which added resources have 
been expended, capital invested, and in some instances "sunk costs" in-
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curred that up the settlement demands and reduce the probability of a set-
tlement until trial or arbitration occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
The central premise of this analysis is that far too many clients are be-
ing betrayed by their lawyers through the combination of fee abuse, neglect, 
and incompetence to the extent that the representation can be a cynical sham 
or a professional embarrassment to anyone aware of what has occurred. For 
many clients the attempt to obtain quality service from their lawyers is a 
kind of con game in which the promises and illusions woven by the obscure 
mystery of their lawyers' activities far exceed the results. Nor are there any 
effective mechanisms in place to protect clients or that allow them to know 
when their lawyers have abused their responsibility of loyalty, trust, and 
quality. 
It should be clear from the examples presented in this article that law-
yers and judges cannot be trusted to "self-regulate." Consider the numerous 
situations where I directly observed clearly unprofessional behavior related 
to delay, fee churning, grossly negligent acts and failures to act, fraudulent 
over-billing, and more. I experienced such conditions, but as a lawyer and 
teacher of ethics and strategy, I didn't file a single grievance or ethical 
complaint against another lawyer. Nor did I inform opposing clients of what 
I considered to be significant breaches on the part of their attorneys that 
harmed their interests, both because I was forbidden to do so by ethical 
rules against contact with opposing clients and because it was not in my 
clients' interests to "provide aid and comfort to the enemy." Along with this 
is the fact that the procedures and intensity of conflict with other lawyers 
against whom complaints could be made would almost certainly be a drain 
on time, energy, and resources as well as a poisoning of relationships with 
other lawyers. When we add onto these considerations the failure of judges 
who are aware of the behavior of lawyers in cases but do little or nothing to 
demand higher levels of professional and ethical performance, it should be 
clear that the self-regulation on which the lawyers' system of professional-
ism and ethics is premised is a non-starter. 
Self-regulation is at the core of lawyers' arguments that they should be 
trusted with oversight of the behavior of lawyers. The ABA's Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct leads off with the assertion that: "The legal profes-
sion is largely self-governing .... [T]he legal profession is unique in this 
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the 
processes of government and law enforcement. "66 The Model Rules go on to 
state: "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional 
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calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation 
also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government 
domination."67 In the Preamble's paragraph 12 the conclusion is that: "The 
legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities 
of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its 
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of 
parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar."68 
Of course as I have sought to demonstrate, the entire foundation on 
which the organized bar rests the edifice of entitlement to self-regulation 
and special rules is a self-serving bed of sand having little to do with the 
reality of private law practice. My argument is that since lawyers' oaths 
professing duty and loyalty on clients' behalf do not work for many law-
yers, there is a need for a regulatory system with "teeth." A system is need-
ed that increases the likelihood that lawyers will improve their behavior due 
to an enhanced probability of exposure of failures and accountability 
whether through loss of the right to practice or compensation awarded to 
wronged clients for inadequate legal performance. 
As the system now stands, the organized bar's regulatory mechanisms 
are ineffective, and legal malpractice standards through which wronged 
clients are required to seek redress are too complex and expensive. It is cur-
rently impossible to enforce rules on quality of legal services through pri-
vate litigation at this point due to the cost and complexities of those cases 
and the requirement of proving that the lawyers' deficient representation 
caused damage. This creates a disincentive among lawyers that allows them 
to offer deficient representation with virtually no concern about chances of 
personal negative consequences. This insulated system of non-
accountability for lawyers works to deprofessionalize the bar because law-
yers can get away with almost anything. The challenge is how do we moti-
vate lawyers toward improved client services and eventually weed out the 
worst lawyers through identification. 
My argument is that the false system of legal ethics and phony or the-
oretical lawyer liability is "broken." It cannot be fixed by tinkering with its 
apparent rules because the primary flaws have to do with implementation 
rather than technical language. The existing system should therefore be 
abandoned and a specific statutory system developed for consumers of legal 
services. Without such a system there will be no real lawyer ethics practiced 
by many attorneys, and clients will continue to be provided ineffective and 
overly expensive services without any real remedy. 
In fact ethics and professionalism as currently conceived have little to 
do with the behavior and operating conditions of lawyers as a business. The 
67. /d.'l]ll. 
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pretense of an independent self-regulating legal profession simply allows 
lawyers to rationalize and justify poor and venal performance and insulate 
themselves from accountability. A system involving consumer warranties of 
service quality, fraud statutes, fee and expense shifting from clients to law-
yers when a client's claim for inadequate service is established, and a mini-
mum in statutory damages if neglect is demonstrated, along with require-
ments for realistic pre-engagement estimates concerning the likely costs of 
representation (at least in some categories of cases) could dramatically in-
fluence lawyer behavior. 
